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INTRODUCTION
In 1985, the Texas Department of Transportation created an ad
campaign to stop roadside litter.1 The slogan was simple: Don’t Mess
with Texas.2 Since then, this saying has morphed into a pseudo state
motto. In a state known for its fierce independence and dedication to
private property, one could aptly modify the phrase to Don’t Mess with
Texas Property.3
While many Texans view private property rights as unalterable,
the reality is much more nuanced. This is particularly true when discussing natural resources like groundwater. Unlike activities occurring at the
surface, removal of groundwater can impact the surrounding property
owners, who may prefer their property to be protected from drainage.4
Consideration of the public’s interest in natural resources, as required by
the 1917 state constitutional conservation amendment, creates another
layer of concern.5 When all interests are considered together, it is clear
that the law does allow for legal limitations on property owners in order
to protect the value of others’ property rights.6 This is not unlike the
consideration of the environment when issuing surface water permits or
limiting private property uses to avoid nuisance.
Texans’ dependence on groundwater is not new.7 Although groundwater has historically been used by farmers throughout the state’s history,
1

Alex Mayyasi, The Surprising Origins of “Don’t Mess With Texas”, PRICEONOMICS (June 11,
2014), https://priceonomics.com/the-surprising-origins-of-don’t-mess-with-texas/ [https://
perma.cc/4JVW-BK5H].
2
Id.
3
See Timothy Sandefur, Don’t Mess with Property Rights in Texas: How the State Constitution Protects Property Owners in the Wake of Kelo, 41 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 44, 46
(2006). Ninety-five percent of Texas is privately owned. Jennifer Dorsett, Texas Landowners
Face Uncertainty with Eminent Domain, TEX. FARM BUREAU (Apr. 23, 2019), https://texas
farmbureau.org/texas-landowners-face-uncertainty-eminent-domain/ [https://perma.cc
/4Q5D-Y6WT].
4
See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., GROUND-WATER DEPLETION ACROSS THE NATION 1–2 (2003).
5
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
6
Id.
7
Groundwater is defined by the Texas Water Code as “water percolating below the
surface of the earth.” TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.001(5) (West 2017). Implementing
regulations state that groundwater is “[w]ater under the surface of the ground other than
underflow of a stream and underground streams, whatever may be the geologic structure
in which it is standing or moving.” 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 297.1(22) (2012). Once
groundwater leaves the ground in the form of springs or discharges into a river, its legal
character changes and it becomes surface water. Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d
235, 236 (Tex. App. 1989).

2022] NEW STRATEGIES FOR GROUNDWATER LITIGATION IN TEXAS

357

municipal and industrial uses have consistently increased.8 Even many
state surface water users are dependent on groundwater to provide the
headwaters and base flow of many Texas rivers.9 As Texas’ population
continues to grow, so will its demand on groundwater—even while many
of these resources continue to deplete. The state’s resilience depends on
effective management.
As dependence on groundwater increased, so did tensions related
to property rights.10 This culminated in the 2012 Texas Supreme Court
ruling in the Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, which established a vested
right in groundwater.11 Since that decision, conversations and litigation
have centered on defining the Fifth Amendment rights of property owners
who are denied water rights.12 The threat of a takings claim obligates
Groundwater Conservation Districts (“GCDs”) to evaluate the potential
of costly litigation when promulgating or enforcing permitting rules.13
Centering on the ability of a landowner who is denied a property right to
bring a takings claim shifts the focus away from owners with conflicting
economic interests and statutory obligations to conserve water. This
effectively prioritizes the property interests of those who wish to pump
over those who value leaving water in place, and this ignores state law
obligating water protection.
Vested groundwater rights are not the end of the story. The majority
of the state’s groundwater is managed by GCDs, which are formed to regulate pumping and protect water resources.14 A GCD is allowed to modify
property rights consistent with Chapter 36 of the Texas Water Code.15
Among other requirements, GCDs are required to create a management
plan that conserves water and protects natural resources, and pass rules
8

PETER G. GEORGE ET AL., AQUIFERS OF TEXAS, REPORT 380, 10 (Tex. Water Dev. Bd. 2011).
See id. at 91, 107, 129.
10
See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 817–18 (Tex. 2012).
11
Id. at 838.
12
See Kathryn M. Casey, Comment, Water in the West: Vested Water Rights Merit Protection Under the Takings Clause, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 305, 306, 349 (2003).
13
See Lone Star GCD Approves Settlement Ending Litigation with Conroe and Quadvest,
HELLO WOODLANDS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://hellowoodlands.com/lone-star-gcd-approve
-settlement-ending-litigation-with-conroe-and-quadvest/ [https://perma.cc/6KKJ-2M7A].
14
TEX. WATER DEV. BD., Groundwater Conservation Districts, https://www.twdb.texas.gov
/groundwater/conservation_districts/index.asp [https://perma.cc/59PB-VZPC] (last visited
Jan. 12, 2022).
15
Throughout Texas, there are areas that are not managed by groundwater districts. In
those “white areas,” there are no additional groundwater regulations beyond common law
protections. This Article focuses on the areas of the state subject to GCD regulations. See
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.0015, 36.021(d) (West 2017).
9
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that are in harmony with that plan.16 Districts are also obligated to
designate a goal for future aquifer conditions and to issue pumping
permits consistent with that goal.17 This process is analogous to land use
law and zoning, in which the city creates a vision for its future and zones,
and implements said vision utilizing the delegated police power authority
to restrict some landowners for the benefit of the larger community.18
Conservation-oriented landowners, the larger community, and the natural
resources themselves also have recognized legal rights. When one views
the larger context of GCDs’ authority and obligations, litigation avenues
are available that will balance the rights of all owners and better protect
water resources.
This Article evaluates the evolution of the understanding of groundwater rights since the Day decision and assesses the relative power of
property rights in groundwater that have emerged and what can be done
to equalize resulting inequities. Part I reviews the current state of groundwater ownership rights and includes a brief history of litigation that led
to that point.19 Part II explains the authority and obligations of groundwater conservation districts, which create a regulatory overlay on the
common law vested rights through permitting rules and the statewide
planning process.20 Part III summarizes the history of constitutional challenges litigated after the Day decision established a vested property right
in groundwater.21
Finally, Part IV presents recommendations for how litigation can
also be used by landowners who seek to maintain their groundwater or
protect the resource itself.22 First, litigants can use the obligations in
Chapter 36, which find their roots in the conservation amendment, to
compel GCDs to plan and permit groundwater in ways that prioritize
conservation and avoid waste.23 Second, an examination of inverse condemnation jurisprudence provides pathways for courts to avoid requiring
compensation for alleged property rights infringements.24 Finally, other
16

WATER § 36.1071.
Id. § 36.108 (c)–(d).
18
Cf. AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 25-2, art. I, § 1-1 (2021) (City zoning ordinance intended to protect older neighborhoods by requiring new construction and additions
in existing neighborhoods to be characteristically compatible).
19
See discussion infra Part I.
20
See discussion infra Part II.
21
See discussion infra Part III.
22
See discussion infra Part IV.
23
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
24
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
17
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litigation opportunities are discussed including options for impacted
surface water rights holders.25
I.

THE CHALLENGE OF CAPTURE

Texas is a popular place to be these days.26 The promise of jobs,
no state income tax, and affordable housing is attracting people from coast
to coast.27 Due to its appeal, Texas’ population is predicted to increase
seventy percent between 2020 and 2070, from 29.5 million to 51 million
people.28 Each of these citizens will need water with an estimated total
demand increase of seventeen percent in the next fifty years.29 Population trends project that most Texans will be concentrated in a few urban
areas, further increasing infrastructure challenges.30 Water needed to
meet these growing demands must be found in a drought-prone state
with increasing aridity and highly allocated surface water. Because of
these challenges, groundwater will continue to be a critical resource to
meet new water needs.
According to the 2017 State Water Plan, Texas’ nine major aquifers and twenty-one minor aquifers provided nearly fifty percent of the
water used throughout the state, which amounted to 7.19 million acre-feet
per year.31 Agriculture accounted for the majority of statewide groundwater use.32 Approximately seventy-five percent of irrigated agriculture
utilized a total of 6.4 million acre-feet of groundwater per year.33 Despite
this existing dependence, groundwater capacity is projected to decrease
twenty-four percent by 2070, primarily due to groundwater mining in the
Ogallala and Gulf Coast Aquifers.34

25

See discussion infra Section IV.C.
See Andy Kiersz & Madison Hoff, Elon Musk, Like Everyone Else, Is Moving to Texas.
Here are 12 Lone Star State Cities America Is in Love With., BUS. INSIDER (May 19, 2021,
9:54 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/texas-cities-everyone-is-moving-to-2019-11
[https://perma.cc/5MTQ-MP9A].
27
Key Reasons Why Millions Are Moving to Texas, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 19, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/texas-business-census-2020-science-0d436b250dc07111bff4b4f
6cdd6682b [https://perma.cc/EKA8-W5XE].
28
TEX. WATER DEV. BD., STATE WATER PLAN 3 (2017).
29
Id. This is a decrease from twenty-two percent in the 2012 plan.
30
Id. at 3, 5–6.
31
Id. at 65, 70, 72. An acre-foot is equal to 325,851 gallons of water.
32
Id. at 70.
33
Id.
34
TEX. WATER DEV. BD., supra note 28, at 71.
26
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Many groundwater resources have no regulation, placing them at
the mercy of overlying landowners.35 Others have a variety of regulatory
schemes managing their use, which leads to inconsistencies and confusion for property owners.36 The growing dependence on groundwater,
coupled with legal questions related to regulations and property rights,
threatens the viability of many of these resources. Because litigation history in Texas has imbued property owners with a vested ownership interest
in groundwater, overseeing groundwater use must respect existing property rights while still considering natural resource protection. Post-Day
litigation has focused on property owners who wish to pump and are
denied a permit, but property owners who wish to protect the water under
their land are speaking with increasing volume and are unwilling to cede
their own rights to property value. To project the future of Texas’ water
litigation, one must first understand how courts have managed these
issues in the past.
A.

East and Sipriano

Right of capture was first adopted as Texas’ groundwater management approach in 1904 by the Texas Supreme Court in Houston & T. C.
Ry. Co. v. East.37 Under right of capture, a landowner has equal ownership
of the soil and the water and can drain water from a neighbor without liability.38 The East court made exceptions for injury as a result of malice
or willful waste.39 Subsidence was later added as an additional exception.40
In its reasoning, the court stated that the complexity of groundwater made it difficult to govern differently and they feared that a
shared system such as correlative rights may interfere with the state’s
economic development.41
The issue of capture was not considered again until 1999, when the
Texas Supreme Court evaluated whether the rule of capture remained the
35

See TEX. A&M UNIV., Texas water law, https://texaswater.tamu.edu/water-law.html
[https://perma.cc/7ESP-YWXS] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
36
Kate Galbraith, Ambiguities Reign in Regulations for Groundwater Fracking, TEX.
TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2013, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2013/03/13/fracking-ground
water-rules-reflect-legal-ambiguiti/ [https://perma.cc/6V5U-8GVV].
37
See Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (Tex. 1904).
38
Id. at 280.
39
Id. at 281–82.
40
Id. Common law right of capture is limited by waste, malicious intent and negligent
pumping that would lead to subsidence. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith–Sw. Indus., 576
S.W.2d 21, 22, 25–26 (Tex. 1978).
41
East, 81 S.W. at 280–81.
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state’s preferred method of groundwater management.42 In Sipriano v.
Great Spring Waters of America, a landowner whose wells had been drained
by a bottled water company, asked the court to replace strict rule of capture and replace it with reasonable use.43
Despite indications in dicta that the court felt the law of capture
might be outdated, the court refused to abandon it.44 After expressing
misgivings about such a rule in a growing state, the court reiterated that
the capitol should be the source of any changes citing the importance of
recent groundwater initiatives including Senate Bill 1 (“SB 1”).45 Instead,
the court stated such a decision was not within the court’s authority—not
yet at least.46
B.

From Right of Capture to Ownership

As courts maintained the rule of capture, questions began to arise
concerning the specifics of the property right created by the common law
rule. Although Texas courts stated on multiple occasions that capture
was the law, neither the courts nor lawmakers ever specified if ownership
vested in place or upon capture.47 The answer to this question did not
have a significant impact when there was sufficient water for all users,
but defining the line between regulatory opportunities and constitutional
limitations on property is more critical as water supplies diminish.48
While most GCDs have not created a cap on pumping, the Edwards
Aquifer Authority (“EAA”), a legislatively created special district, formed
as a result of a court ruling on an Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) claim,
was created with pumping limits in mind.49
The Edwards Aquifer Authority Act (“EAAA”) capped permit
withdrawals in the Edwards Aquifer to 450,000 acre-feet per calendar
42

Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Tex. 1999).
Id. at 75–76.
44
Id. at 80.
45
Id. at 79.
46
Id. at 80.
47
See, e.g., id. at 76; Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (Tex. 1904).
48
See Marvin W. Jones & Andrew Little, The Ownership of Groundwater in Texas: A Contrived Battle for State Control of Groundwater, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 578, 579–80, 592 (2009)
(“[B]ecause ownership of the water in place is not clear, it would occur to me that in the
future, there is a lot of opportunity for central control of that water.” (quoting Sen. Duncan)).
49
Joe Nick Patoski, History, The Edwards Aquifer & the EAA, EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTH.,
https://www.edwardsaquifer.org/eaa/history [https://perma.cc/8PZB-BGE6] (last visited
Jan. 12, 2022).
43
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year until December 31, 2007.50 Beginning January 1, 2008, permitted
withdrawals were reduced to 400,000 acre-feet annually.51 The EAAA was
later amended to increase permitted withdrawals to 572,000 acre-feet per
year.52 In addition to dictating how much water could be pumped, the legislation provides a rubric for permit allocation.53 Historic permits were issued
to those who could demonstrate beneficial use of Edwards water during the
historic period.54 An irrigator who could demonstrate use, but not a specific
quantity, received a permit for two acre-feet a year per acre irrigated
during any one year of the historic period.55 All requests for historic permits
were due by March 1, 1994.56 Other than the stated exceptions, it is illegal
to pump water from the Edwards Aquifer without an EAA permit.57
The EAA’s strict limitations on new permits and clear limitations
on historic use designations gave rise to the specific questions of ownership
when permits were denied.58 Day provided the Texas Supreme Court the
opportunity to clarify when ownership rights in groundwater vest.59
Plaintiff Day applied for a historic permit to pump 700 acre-feet
of Edwards water annually. To support his request, he presented evidentiary statements of 300 irrigated acres during the look-back period and
additional 50 acre-feet for recreational use in a lake on the property into
which some groundwater flowed.60
The EAA issued a preliminary decision entitling Day to 600 acrefeet of water.61 Before the EAA ruled on his permit, Day drilled a new

50

Act of May 30, 1993, § 1.14(a)–(c).
Id.
52
Act of May 28, 2007, ch. 1430, § 12.02(c), 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 5902 (amending Act of
May 30, 1993, § 1.11). When the Act of May 28, 2007, was passed, the law included the
400,000 acre-feet per year provision; however, the EAA was required to permit 572,000
acre-feet per year based on strict application of the rules. Darcy Alan Frownfelter,
Groundwater Withdrawal Permit Program, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER RESOURCES
§ 17.20 (State Bar of Tex. eds. 2018). The cap increase was an effort to match the legislation to actual permits issued.
53
Act of May 30, 1993, §§ 1.14–1.16.
54
Id. § 1.16(a). “An existing user may apply for an initial regular permit by filing a
declaration of historical use of underground water withdrawn from the aquifer during the
historical period from June 1, 1972, through May 31, 1993.”
55
Id. § 1.16(e).
56
Id. § 1.16(b).
57
Id. § 1.35.
58
See, e.g., Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831–32 (Tex. 2012).
59
See id.
60
Id. at 820.
61
Id. at 817.
51
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well.62 In November 2000, Day’s permit request was denied because well
“withdrawals . . . were not placed to a beneficial use.”63
After a long procedural history, the case arrived at the Texas
Supreme Court in 2010.64 The primary legal issue was whether Day had
a vested interest in the groundwater thus limiting the EAA’s ability to
deny a permit without owing compensation.65 The court determined that
the groundwater rights were vested in the landowner.66 Despite this
determination, the court reiterated that regulations can dictate a district’s authority to regulate wells, but too much regulation would constitute a constitutional taking requiring compensation.67 Day defined the
property right to water, which limits the extent to which districts can
regulate groundwater before it becomes a regulatory taking.68 Unfortunately for regulators, the court did not define where that limit is.69
II.

THE HISTORY AND AUTHORITY OF GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION
DISTRICTS

As Texas courts consistently maintained property right in groundwater, the legislature promulgated regulation to assist in management.70
The first piece of legislation was passed in 1910 and 1917 in the form of
a constitutional amendment creating both the authority and the duty for
the state to protect the state’s natural resources.71 Although not selfenacting, it clearly obligates the legislature to implement policy relating
to groundwater and other natural resources.72 This conservation amendment has been cited regularly in court opinions to support the argument
62

Id. at 820. The well cost $95,000.
Id. at 820–21.
64
Day, 369 S.W.3d at 821–22.
65
See id. at 821–33, 837–43.
66
Id. at 833. The court remanded to determine the specific issue of whether a taking had
occurred in this case. It ultimately settled for an undisclosed amount.
67
Id. at 843.
68
Id. at 832–33.
69
Id. at 839–41.
70
See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
71
Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tex. 1999) (“The
conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this State . . . and the
preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each and all
hereby declared public rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as
may be appropriate thereto.” (quoting TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a))).
72
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
63
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that the legislature, not the judiciary, is the appropriate body to implement laws to manage groundwater.73
A.

Birth and Evolution of GCDs

Using the authority found in the conservation amendment, the
legislature opted to manage groundwater resources through local GCDs
instead of a statewide regulatory agency.74 A GCD’s purpose is:
To provide for the conservation, preservation, protection,
recharging, and prevention of waste of groundwater, and
of groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions, and to
control subsidence caused by withdrawal of water from
those groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions, consistent with the objectives of Section 59, Article XVI, [of the]
Texas Constitution . . . .75
Although GCDs were permissive as early as 1917, only thirty-four
districts existed in 1996.76 Often, conversations about the need for additional water management only surfaced after dry years.77 Even then, it
generally focused on discrete issues rather than a wholesale approach.78
Texas’ first historic omnibus water bill, SB 1, marked the first attempt to
shift from water development to a statewide approach to groundwater.79
SB 1 was passed in 1997 after a three-year drought.80 Lack of rain combined with a rapidly growing state let to an important leadership moment
in Texas water.81

73

See, e.g., Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79–80.
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (West 2019).
75
Id.
76
Groundwater Conservation Districts, TEX. WATER DEV. BD., https://www.twdb.texas.gov
/groundwater/conservation_districts/index.asp [https://perma.cc/W36T-77R2] (choose “District Map” in the drop-down menu under “Groundwater Conservation Districts”) (last
visited Jan. 12, 2022).
77
Martin Hubert, Senate Bill 1, The First Big and Bold Step Toward Meeting Texas’s
Future Water Needs, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 53, 55 (1999).
78
Chris Lehman, Hung Out to Dry?: Groundwater Conservation Districts and the Continuing Battle to Save Texas’s Most Precious Resource, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 101, 107 (2004).
79
Id. SB 1 is one of three omnibus water bills ever passed. The others are SB 2 and SB 3.
80
Hubert, supra note 77, at 55.
81
Id. at 55–56.
74
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SB 1 significantly impacted Texas groundwater.82 Due to the low
number of GCDs, the vast majority of the state did not have any groundwater management in place.83 However, because SB 1 stated that “[g]roundwater conservation districts . . . are the state’s preferred method of
groundwater management,” the number of districts grew quickly after its
passage.84 The preference for GCDs centered on empowering control at the
local level, with those who have the best understanding of the resource.85
The regulations and responsibilities associated with GCDs were
consolidated into Chapter 36 of the Texas Water Code.86 This chapter
defines how districts can be created, their means of governance, the extent
of their powers, and obligations.87 Although SB 1 did not create districts,
it did expand their authority, obligated districts to complete management
plans, and required permits for any nonexempt wells.88 Districts could
also issue or deny permits for out-of-basin water transfers.89 Although SB
1 increased regulation opportunities in areas with a GCD, it did not
replace the right of capture as Texas’ management scheme.
A second omnibus water bill, Senate Bill 2 (“SB 2”), was passed
in 2001. SB 2 further enhanced the permitting and enforcement powers
of GCDs.90 The bill provided for further regulation of well spacing to
minimize well interference.91 Districts were also authorized to set acrefeet per acre or gallons per minute production limits based on tract size
or production capacity.92 Some GCDs require the installation of well meters
and require reporting of groundwater pumping.93

82

Lehman, supra note 78, at 104.
Id.
84
Id.; TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (West 2019).
85
Hubert, supra note 77, at 66.
86
Russell Johnson, Groundwater Law and Regulation, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER
RESOURCES 113 (Mary K. Sahs ed., 2009).
87
See WATER § 36.0001 et. seq. GCDs can “limit[] groundwater production based on tract size
or the spacing of wells, to provide for conserving, preserving, protecting, and recharging of
the groundwater or of a groundwater reservoir or its subdivisions in order to control
subsidence, prevent degradation of water quality, or prevent waste of groundwater.” Id. §
36.101(a).
88
Hubert, supra note 77, at 66.
89
Act of June 1, 1997 § 4.33 at 3648 (codified in TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.122).
90
Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Legis., R.S., ch. 966, §§ 2.49–50, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991
at 2015 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.116).
91
Id. § 2.50.
92
Id.
93
See, e.g., HIGH PLAINS UNDERGROUND WATER CONSERVATION DIST., RULES OF THE HIGH
PLAINS WATER DISTRICT (Nov. 24, 2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53286fe5e
4b0bbf6a4535d75/t/5fbebdc7145a8629dc92cd9e/1606335943119/HPWD+Adopted+Rules
83
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GCDs provide a regional, bottom-up approach to planning that
allows a tailored approach to individual aquifer management.94 Although
these legislatively created districts have extensive regulatory authority,
the rule of capture still looms large.95
B.

A Legacy of Protection

GCDs cannot be separated from resource protection. Even the name
“groundwater conservation district” telegraphs their overriding purpose.
If the legislator intended districts to simply allocate property rights, they
might have been named Groundwater Permitting Districts or some equivalent. In fact, the authority for their existence emanates from a conservation
principle found in the conservation amendment that is consistently echoed
throughout the regulations and authority chronicled in Chapter 36.96
The primary purpose of districts is “to provide for the conservation,
preservation, protection, recharging, and prevention of waste of groundwater, and of groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions, and to control
subsidence caused by withdrawal of water from those groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions, consistent with the objectives of Section 59,
Article XVI, Texas Constitution . . . .”97 While ownership may constrain
the ways in which GCDs can limit pumping, it does not negate their
ability to regulate groundwater extraction.98 This regulatory authority is
explicitly stated in statute and referenced in case law.99
Section 36.002 of the Texas Water Code states that ownership
“rights may be limited or altered by rules promulgated by a district.”100
The Day opinion reinforces this sentiment.101 By stating that extreme
regulation might create a Fifth Amendment violation, the court is clearly
indicating that some groundwater regulation is expected to continue.102
+November+2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP56-89WS].
94
Lehman, supra note 78, at 103.
95
See Act of May 27, 2001, § 2.50 at 2015–16 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.116).
96
See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015(b) (West 2019).
97
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015(b) (emphasis added). Groundwater is defined as “water
percolating below the surface of the earth.” Id. § 36.001(5). A groundwater reservoir is defined as “a specific subsurface water-bearing reservoir having ascertainable boundaries
containing groundwater.” Id. § 36.001(6).
98
See WATER § 36.002(d)(2) (West 2019).
99
See WATER § 36.101(a)(4) (West 2019); Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc.,
1 S.W.3d 75, 78–80 (Tex. 1999).
100
WATER § 36.002 (West 2011), amended by Act of June 16, 2015, 84th Legis., R.S., ch.
590, § 1, 2015 Tex. Sess. Laws.
101
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 833, 842–43 (Tex. 2012).
102
Id. at 833–36. The opinion also reviews the history of GCDs and their rulemaking
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Before reviewing Section 36.116(a) in detail, the court specifically states
that “[d]istricts’ regulatory authority is broad . . . .”103 This balance
between ownership and regulation for the greater good is not unfamiliar.
The use of the police powers to modify property rights without requiring
compensation has been permitted countless times in land use litigation
since Euclidian zoning was deemed to be constitutional in 1926.104 The
ability to curb the absolute access to groundwater for the protection of
the water source and other landowners who also have a vested right is
analogous to zoning jurisprudence.
Even in areas without GCDs, the common law places limits on the
absolute ownership rule.105 Throughout the adjudication history, courts
have recognized the requirement that water must be put to a beneficial
use without willful waste or malice.106 Later, the rule was expanded to
also prohibit a landowner from negligent groundwater withdrawal that
would result in subsidence of another’s land.107 Chapter 36 includes these
common law rules and obligates districts to go further.108
Perhaps the most important obligation related to groundwater is
the requirement for a beneficial use, which was stated as early as East.109
The challenge for districts is defining “beneficial.” Use for a beneficial
purpose is defined broadly to include uses such as agriculture, domestic
use, water for mineral exploration, and “any other purpose that is useful
and beneficial to the user.”110 Although “beneficial” is written broadly to
provide flexibility in what might be included, one thing that is prohibited
is waste.111 By definition, water that is wasted cannot be considered put
to a beneficial use.112 Beneficial is the basis and the measure of the quantity in relation to the use.

authority.
103
Id. at 835.
104
See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that limiting
of individual private property rights for the benefit of the community through the
adoption of a comprehensive zoning plan is constitutionally within the authority of the
police powers so long as the plan is not arbitrary and capricious).
105
Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 77.
106
Id. at 76 (citing Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 279 (Tex. 1904)).
A landowner may make non-wasteful use of their waters. Pecos Cnty. Water Control and
Improvement Dist. v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
107
Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 78 (citing Friendswood, 576 S.W.2d 21).
108
See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002(b) (West 2019).
109
Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 281 (Tex. 1904).
110
WATER § 36.001(8) (West 2017).
111
See id. § 36.001(9).
112
See id. § 36.001(9)(c).
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While GCDs have discretion within their rulemaking authority,
one of their primary obligations to meet the express purpose is to create
a management plan.113 This plan has many listed objectives. They are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

(8)

providing the most efficient use of groundwater;
controlling and preventing waste of groundwater;
controlling and preventing subsidence;
addressing conjunctive surface water management
issues;
addressing natural resource issues;
addressing drought conditions;
addressing conservation, recharge enhancement,
rainwater harvesting, precipitation enhancement, or
brush control, where appropriate and cost-effective;
and
addressing the desired future conditions adopted
by the district under Section 36.108 . . . .114

These plans “shall” be created in coordination with regional surface
water managers.115
Once a district identifies their management goals and they are
approved by the Texas Water Development Board (“TWDB”), the district
“shall adopt rules necessary to implement the management plan.”116 The
tools GCDs have to meet their conservation and protection obligations
113

See id. § 36.1071(a)(1–8).
Id. Details of plan obligations can be found in the TWDB rules. 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 356.52. Notable requirements include: “providing the most efficient use of groundwater;” “controlling and preventing waste of groundwater;” “addressing conjunctive
surface water management issues . . . ;” “addressing natural resource issues;” and
“addressing conservation.”
115
WATER § 36.1071(a) (West 2011).
116
Id. § 36.1071(f) (emphasis added).
A district may make and enforce rules, including rules limiting groundwater production based on tract size or the spacing of wells, to provide
for conserving, preserving, protecting, and recharging of the groundwater or of a groundwater reservoir or its subdivisions in order to
control subsidence, prevent degradation of water quality, or prevent
waste of groundwater and to carry out the powers and duties provided
by this chapter.
Id. § 36.101. Senator Perry introduced a bill in 2021 that would allow “[a] person with
groundwater ownership and rights [to] petition the district where the property that gives
rise to the ownership and rights is located to adopt a rule or modify a rule adopted under
this chapter.” S.B. 152, 87th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (as introduced on Mar. 3, 2021).
114
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are clearly enumerated in statute.117 While a GCD has discretion to add
additional obligations, the statute again requires districts to ensure water
is used wisely. In any permit application or modification, a GCD must
consider whether “the proposed use of water is dedicated to any beneficial
use” and whether “the applicant has agreed to avoid waste and achieve
water conservation.”118 Although GCDs must wait for plan approval before
they can fully promulgate rules, districts are permitted to regulate pumping in the interim to ensure water is put to a beneficial use without
waste.119 This advanced permission authority underscores the importance of that goal above all others.
Despite the repeated emphasis on ensuring conservation and
beneficial use, the reality is that an individual district likely cannot accomplish this for an entire aquifer over which many GCDs may be
operating, which is why the law also requires collaborative planning.
C.

The Groundwater Planning Process

After the passage of SB 1, the number of districts increased dramatically.120 There are currently ninety-eight confirmed districts and
three pending.121 Even with the increased authority to regulate groundwater, no immediate conflict between regulators and property rights was
apparent. The first notable increase in tension began when regional
planning processes indicated that any water access may be curtailed.
Increased regulation, coupled with increasing demand, placed owners and
regulators on a collision course.
Statewide water planning was first discussed in SB 1.122 The bill
created a planning process and required what information must be
included in GCD’s management plans.123 Specifically, plans must include
the district’s objectives and performance standards, and demonstrate
how the plan’s goals will be achieved.124

117

WATER § 36.101(a) (West 2019).
Id. § 36.113 (d)(3), (6).
119
Id. § 36.1071(f).
120
Lehman, supra note 78, at 104.
121
Groundwater Conservation District Facts, TEX. WATER DEV. BD., http://www.twdb.texas
.gov/groundwater/conservation_districts/facts.asp [https://perma.cc/JPX3-QNF7] (last
visited Jan. 12, 2022).
122
Hubert, supra note 77, at 57.
123
Id. at 57.
124
See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.1071(e) (2011).
118
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GCDs are created based on political boundaries; therefore, many
districts may overlay a single aquifer.125 To compel multiple districts to
coordinate in shared aquifer planning, the state created Groundwater
Management Areas (“GMAs”).126 The state’s sixteen GMAs play a large
role in statewide planning.127 In addition to creating goals for the shared
aquifer, GCDs within the same GMA also must share their groundwater
management plans.128
The integrated groundwater planning process contemplated in SB
1 and SB 2 did not fully take shape until the passage of House Bill 1763
(“HB 1763”) in 2005, which made significant changes to the planning
process.129 HB 1763 regionalized decisions on groundwater availability
and required statewide regional planning groups to integrate groundwater availability numbers from the GMA process in their statewide water
forecasting.130
HB 1763 also required coordination between the GCDs within a
GMA.131 Often, numerous GCDs in each GMA have varying approaches
to management and sustainability.132 Previously, GCDs could define their
own groundwater availability for their individual management plans,
which meant there could be several different approaches for the same
aquifer.133 Joint planning sought to remedy this conflict by requiring a
desired future condition (“DFC”) for an entire management area.134
A DFC is “[t]he desired, quantified condition of groundwater
resources (such as water levels, spring flows, or volumes) within a management area at one or more specified future times as defined by participating groundwater conservation districts within a groundwater management area as part of the joint planning process.”135 A DFC allows a
region to determine what they want the resource to look like in the

125

Robert E. Mace et al., A Streetcar Named Desired Future Conditions: The New Groundwater Availability for Texas (Revised), in THE CHANGING FACE OF WATER RIGHTS IN TEXAS,
ch. 2.1, at 2 (2008).
126
Id. at 1. The name “groundwater management area” has changed over the years but
will be referred to throughout with this current moniker.
127
Id. at 1.
128
Act of May 27, 2001, § 2.48 at 2013–15 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108).
129
See Act of May 30, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 970, 3254–56 (amending TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 36.108).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 3254.
132
Mace et al., supra note 125, at 2.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 356.10(9).
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future.136 GMAs that have more than one aquifer can create DFCs for
each.137 The “future time” can be selected by the districts. GCDs must reconsider the groundwater availability models every five years and review
their DFCs.138 The DFC can be updated during each review process.
Once a DFC is established, the TWDB conducts groundwater
modeling to translate that goal into the amount of managed available
groundwater (“MAG”) available for pumping to meet the DFC.139 A district’s management plans must be consistent with their DFC.140 “A district,
to the extent possible, shall issue permits up to the point that the total
volume of groundwater permitted equals the managed available groundwater” in order to meet the DFC.141 The planning process is intended to
allow for local level engagement and provide for statewide groundwater
sustainability.
The regional planning process and the apparent authorization of
pumping caps to meet DFCs allow districts to limit permitting, which
created conflicts between regulation and the rule of capture. A possible
cap on permitting bestowed significant regulatory power that was previously unauthorized except in certain special districts like the Edwards
Aquifer providing for a new frontier of Texas water litigation.142 The concept of a DFC is a scientific-based methodology to allow for local planning
with the water source as the goal,143 but a goal is only as good as its
implementation and enforcement.
136

Mace et al., supra note 125, at 2.
Act of May 30, 2005, § 8 at 3255 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108).
138
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108(d) (West 2021); 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 356.31(a).
139
Mace et al., supra note 125, at 4–5; Act of May 30, 2005, § 8 at 3254–56 (amending
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108(d)).
140
Mace et al., supra note 125, at 3–4.
141
Act of May 30, 2005, § 11 at 3258 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.1132); 31
TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 356.34–35.
In issuing permits, the district shall manage total groundwater production on a long-term basis to achieve an applicable desired future
condition and consider: (1) the modeled available groundwater determined
by the executive administrator; (2) the executive administrator’s estimate of the current and projected amount of groundwater produced
under exemptions granted by district rules and Section 36.117; (3) the
amount of groundwater authorized under permits previously issued by
the district; (4) a reasonable estimate of the amount of groundwater
that is actually produced under permits issued by the district; and (5)
yearly precipitation and production patterns. WATER § 36.1132(b).
Managers are required to estimate withdrawals for exempt uses.
Id. § 36.1132(c).
142
Mace et al., supra note 125, at 3.
143
See 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 356.10(9) (2021).
137
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If a district fails to meet its joint planning obligations under
Chapter 36, “[a] district or person with a legally defined interest in the
groundwater within the management area may file a petition with the
commission requesting an inquiry if a district or districts refused to join
in the planning process or the process failed to result in adequate planning,” including not establishing a reasonable DFC.144 The commission
can also take direct action if a district fails to submit a management plan,
fails to adopt rules that are not designed to achieve DFCs, rules are not
adequately protective of groundwater, or if the district fails to enforce
their rules.145 Districts are also vulnerable to challenges outside of a joint
planning administrative challenge. “A person, firm, corporation, or association of persons affected by and dissatisfied with any rule or order made
by a district . . . is entitled to file suit . . . to challenge the validity of the law,
rule, or order” after all administrative remedies have been exhausted.146
D.

Turning Desires into Reality

Issues related to the establishment and approval of the DFC
process have already arisen. In August, 2019, TWBD rejected an updated
management plan submitted by Lone Star Groundwater Conservation
District (“Lone Star”) after determining that it was administratively
incomplete.147 Lone Star appealed this determination pursuant to Texas
Water Code Section 36.1072 and Texas Administrative Code Sections
356.50–57.148 In its appeal letter to the TWBD, Lone Star argued that the
rejection exceeded TWDB’s authority, and the determination was in
conflict with the guidance Lone Star had received from TWDB staff.149
The explanation of the history of their management plans highlights the challenges related to modeling assumptions and groundwater

144

WATER § 36.108(f) (2011). Commission refers to the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission. Id. § 36.001(2) (2019). This agency is now known as the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”).
145
Id. §§ 36.301, 36.3011. Permissible actions by the TCEQ under these statutes include
issuing an order to require the district to take or refrain from certain actions, dissolving
the district’s board, asking the attorney general to bring suit, or dissolving the district.
146
Id. § 36.251.
147
Lone Star GDC Appeals the Executive Administrator’s Decision Not to Approve Its
Management Plan, TEX. ALL. GROUNDWATER DIST., at 1 [hereinafter Lone Star GCD
Appeal], https://texasgroundwater.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/lone-star-gcd-appeal
.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFW5-XZXJ] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
148
Id.
149
Id.
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data. In Lone Star’s 2019 plan, the district stated that the 2016 DFCs
and corresponding MAGs had limited applicability because of a previous
finding that they were no longer reasonable; however, Lone Star included
the 2016 numbers because the statute required the latest numbers to be
used.150 The TWDB rejected the submitted plan because it did not include
the 2010 DFCs.151 Lone Star left out the 2010 numbers because they were
superseded by the 2016 figures and the Texas Water Code prohibits
reinstatement of expired DFCs.152 Lone Star argued the 2010 DFCs could
only be included if they were reinstated through a successful vote of the
GMA.153 Lone Star’s appeal was rejected by TWDB in October 2019.154
Lone Star and TWDB settled in mediation, and their management plan
was accepted.155 The final version did attach the 2010 DFCs to make it
administratively complete, and the district adopted goals for long term
water monitoring.156 Although they were attached, Lone Star contends
that DFCs are still unresolved.157
The authority question is increasingly important as the efficacy of
the rules governing GMAs and DFCs become a larger conversation. It presents the embedded question of who, if anyone, can effectively review and
enforce GCD permitting as it relates to DFCs. The TWDB is a planning
agency who has the primary task of providing technical support to translate
DFCs into a permitting reality for the various GCDs within the GMA.158
If that is the limit of their authority, the agency may be obligated if a
150

Press Release, San Jacinto River Authority, State of Texas Rejects Lone Star
Groundwater Conservation District’s Proposed Management Plan for Second Time (Oct.
3, 2019), https://www.sjra.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/10-03-2019-Press-ReleaseTWDB-Re jects-LSGCD-Appeal.pdf [https://perma.cc/FEX3-T89R].
151
Lone Star GCD Appeal, supra note 147, at 1.
152
Id.; see TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108 (West 2017).
153
See Brief in Appeal at 26, Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District’s Appeal of
the Texas Water Development Board’s Executive Administrator’s Decision not to Approve
the District’s Management Plan 26 (Aug. 9, 2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static
/58347802cd0f6854e2f90e45/t/5d54422fc3de050001ac89cd/1565803059294/2019_08-09
_Brief+in+Appeal+%28filestamped%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/22V7-SYQF].
154
Vanessa Holt, Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District Appeal Rejected by Water
Board Oct. 3, CMTY. IMPACT NEWSPAPER (Oct. 3, 2019, 9:46 PM), https://communityim
pact.com/houston/the-woodlands/city-county/2019/10/03/lone-star-groundwater-con
servation-district-appeal-rejected-by-water-board-oct-3/ [https://perma.cc/HDS4-WB37].
155
Telephone Interview with Stacey Reese, Att’y, Lone Star (Feb. 15, 2020).
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
About the Texas Water Development Board, TEX. WATER DEV. BD., https://www.twdb
.texas.gov/about/ [https://perma.cc/7ZJC-FUT2] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
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management plan contained the data required by Section 36.1071(a)–(e)
and TWDB’s own rules dictating administrative completeness.159
In addition to the issue discussed above, and despite the detailed
regulations in Chapter 36, many questions related to groundwater rights
have been, and will continue to be, decided in the courts. While there are
several reasons for this, perhaps the most pertinent is the reluctance of
the legislature to significantly alter rule of capture, or even clearly define
property rights in groundwater since the East decision. Because of the
lack of clarity combined with growing demand, a 2012 Texas Supreme
Court decision permanently limits what changes the legislature can make
to groundwater law, even if they had the will to do so.160
III.

THE CURRENT STATE OF TEXAS GROUNDWATER LITIGATION

Since East, courts have been intricately involved in the shaping
of Texas’ groundwater law. Although the Texas Supreme Court often called
on the legislature to act, significant changes and clarifications never came
until the court spoke in Day, designating a new property right.161 This
vested interest reduces the action that the legislature can take to avoid
rights’ infringement; therefore, the future of water law will be determined
in the courts as questions revolve around defining the extent of ownership rights as GCDs promulgated new rules to meet their DFCs. While
some recent litigation has predictably centered on inverse condemnation,
other important trends have emerged.
A.

Post-Day Takings Litigation

After the Day case, much of the groundwater litigation conversations revolved around trying to predict what type of permitting regulations might constitute a taking. Although the Texas Supreme Court
established a property rights scenario in which excessive permitting regulations could require just compensation, no one knew where that line would
be drawn.162 Because the Day case settled on remand, it was never determined if that fact pattern was an example of an authority going “too far”
in an as-applied takings analysis.163 The first data point on the takings

159

31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 356.50–57; TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.1071 (West 2011).
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 843 (Tex. 2012).
161
Id. at 833.
162
See id.
163
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978). The court
160
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spectrum arrived in rather dynamic fashion, illustrating the impact Day
might have on groundwater districts seeking to strictly regulate pumping.
1.

The Takings Verdict Heard Around the State

While Day was being litigated, another ownership case, Bragg v.
Edwards Aquifer Authority, was also moving through the courts. The
Braggs ultimately prevailed, providing the first and only example of financial compensation in Texas groundwater permitting.164 The Braggs
owned two parcels.165 The first was a 60-acre property called “Home Place”
on which they planted more than 1,800 pecan trees.166 In 1983, the couple
added a 40-acre orchard near D’Hanis and planted 1,500 pecan trees.167 The
Braggs applied for groundwater permits from the EAA for both farms.168
For the Home Place orchard, the Braggs requested approximately twice
the amount of water they had historically used.169 On the D’Hanis orchard,
the Braggs sought a water right despite having no historic use.170 Their
requests totaled about 625 acre-feet per year.171
The EAA denied the permit for the D’Hanis tract because of the lack
of statutorily required historic use.172 For the Home Place, the EAA
limited the permit to 120 acre-feet per year, based on the two acre-feet
per year standard provided in its rules.173 Using this calculation, the
permit issued was approximately half of the quantity requested for that
parcel.174 The Braggs filed suit, citing a Fifth Amendment violation.175 As
the case progressed, the Braggs leased water rights and continued production successfully.176
Applying the economic impact test set out by Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City, the Medina County district court
in the Day case made it clear that any takings evaluation in that case should follow federal
jurisprudence for partial economic deprivation. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 838–40, 838 n. 143.
164
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 118, 153 (Tex. App. 2013).
165
Id. at 124.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 126.
169
Id.
170
Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 126.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. 06-11-18170-CV, slip op. at *2 (Tex. 38th Dist.
Ct. Mar. 25, 2011).
176
Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 342 Fed. Appx. 43, 45 (5th Cir. 2009).
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held that the Braggs were entitled to compensation of $732,493 for the
EAA’s failure to issue the requested pumping permits.177 Both parties
appealed to the Fourth Court of Appeals.178 In August 2013, the court of
appeals issued their opinion, citing the Day case to confirm that a taking
had occurred.179 Applying the Penn Central factors, the court focused on
testimony heard in trial court to assess the economic impact of the regulation, which had prohibited the requested permits.180 Testimony, including evidence of planting of new trees, construction of barns, and installation
of drip irrigation systems, supported their argument that pecan farming
was the highest value use for the properties and a use for which the Braggs
had already made large monetary investments to develop and expand.181
The court of appeals saw the necessity for the Braggs to seek out additional water leases to avoid reducing the number of trees as a concrete
example that met the Penn Central economic impact test.182 “The result
of the regulation forces the Braggs to purchase or lease what they had
prior to the regulation—an unrestricted right to the use of the water
beneath their land.”183
Turning to the investment backed expectations prong of the Penn
Central test, the court found it reasonable that the Braggs had purchased
the property with the intention of having a commercial pecan farm, at
least in part because the properties overlay the Edward’s Aquifer, which
the Braggs believed would provide as much water as they needed.184 Although the Braggs knew about the EAAA when it was passed, both properties were purchased before any regulatory structure was in place.185 The
court noted that, although it would not have been reasonable for them to
assume that they would never be subject to regulation, the fact that none

177

Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. 06-11-18170-CV, slip op. at *2 (Tex. 38th Dist.
Ct. Mar. 25, 2011).
178
Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 126.
179
Id. at 126–51. The court also held that the EAA and not the legislature was responsible
for the payment and provided guidance about how compensation should be calculated in
the case. Id. at 131, 146–51. Finally, the court determined that the statute of limitations
began to run when the permit was denied, not the date of the EAAA’s passage.
180
Id. at 138–45.
181
Id. at 138, 140–41, 143. Pecan orchards presented a slightly different challenge than
traditional agriculture because water is needed year around, not just during a specific
growing season. Additionally, their water demand increased over the years because more
mature trees require more water than the saplings.
182
Id. at 141.
183
Id.
184
Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 142–43.
185
Id. at 143.
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existed when they purchased and invested in the properties should be
weighed when evaluating their investment backed expectations.186
The final prong of the test, which evaluates the nature of the government action, received surprisingly less consideration than the first
two.187 Although the court conceded that “[r]egulation is essential to
[water’s] conservation and use” and “this factor weighs heavily against finding of a compensable taking,” it provided no further information regarding how it was weighed against the others prongs or how it could be
measured.188 Taking the test together as a whole, the court affirmed a
taking had occurred.189 Once the court of appeals had confirmed a taking,
the issue was remanded to trial court to calculate damages consistent
with the opinion.190
Again, both parties appealed, but the Texas Supreme Court declined to hear the case, which was surprising considering it was the first
of its kind since the decision to designate water as a vested property interest.191 Finally, after ten years of litigation, the Braggs received a verdict
in February 2016, entitling them to approximately $2.5 million in compensation for property rights infringements and setting a precedent that
others hoped to follow.192
2.

The Road to Just Compensation

After the large verdict for the Bragg family, many felt there would
be a rush of litigants asserting inverse condemnation claims. This has not
yet occurred for several likely reasons. The length of time takings litigation requires may have a chilling effect on claims being filed. In addition,
although the Bragg’s verdict might be desirable for dejected landowners,
it is a case with a very extreme fact pattern and provides little understanding of where other scenarios might land in a Penn Central analysis.193 Although the court in Day created a vested water right, the opinion is clear
186

Id. at 144.
See id. at 144–45. Contra Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 840–41 (Tex.
2012) (explaining the importance of groundwater in Texas and the need for regulation).
188
Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 145.
189
Id. at 146.
190
Id.
191
See id. at 118.
192
Brendan Gibbons, Edwards Aquifer Authority Must Shell Out to Pecan Farmers, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Feb. 23, 2016, 10:21 AM), https://www.expressnews.com/news
/local/article/BRAGG-VERDICT-6847721.php [https://perma.cc/RC62-LZH4]. Total compensation with interest totaled approximately $4 million.
193
See Bragg, 421 S.W.3d at 138.
187
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that groundwater districts still have the authority to regulate, thus making
an inverse condemnation claim a risky proposition, particularly when the
plaintiffs are responsible for attorney’s fees if they are not successful.194
That said, a few noteworthy cases have been filed that provide guideposts
for takings proponents and districts alike.
In addition to Bragg, another constitutional claim that occurred the
in Edwards Aquifer region is GG Ranch v. EAA.195 The basic fact pattern
mirrors that of Day and Bragg. Here, plaintiffs were landowners with no
historic use who sought water permits in March 2012, which was more than
fifteen years after the December 30, 1996, deadline to submit such a request.196 Plaintiffs’ permit applications were denied solely because of the
late filing.197 After losing a contested case hearing, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit
claiming a violation of their Fifth Amendment property rights by inverse
condemnation, citing the ownership right designated in the Day opinion.198
In their Second Amended Original Petition, Plaintiffs leaned
heavily on their interpretation of the ownership right to the exclusion of
almost all other legal arguments.199 Although the petition recognized that
landowners are subject to EAA’s regulation, it argued that the EAA failed
to regulate permits reasonably and instead “implement[ed] regulation
based on cronyism.”200 Plaintiffs also contended that the full deprivation
of water caused by EAA’s permit denials necessitated compensation.201
Additionally, Plaintiffs claimed violations of their Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process and Equal Protection by arguing that, as historic users, they
were treated differently than other types of groundwater users and because the regulations treat owners of water differently than owners of oil,
gas, and other minerals.202
In June 2015, the district court granted the EAA’s 12(b)(6) motion
dismissing the case.203 In their motion, the primary argument EAA made

194

Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 843 (Tex. 2012).
GG Ranch, Ltd. v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. SA-14-CV-00848, 2015 BL 255526, slip
op. at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2015).
196
Id. at *2. Landowners had property in Uvalde and Medina counties, which are both
within EAA jurisdiction.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Petition at 6–12, GG Ranch, Ltd. v. Edwards
Aquifer Auth., No. SA-14-CV-00848, 2015 BL 255526, slip op. (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2015).
200
Id. at 4. The pleading provided no examples to support that assertion.
201
Id. at 2.
202
Id. at 7–8.
203
GG Ranch, Ltd. v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. SA-14-CV-00848, 2015 BL 255526, slip
op. at *8 (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2015).
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in relation to the takings claim was that it was time-barred.204 They argued
that the ten-year statute of limitations began to run in 1996 when the
EAA Act’s rules impeded the property right for which plaintiffs sought
compensation.205 Looking to state law, the district court agreed.206 Applying the rule that the clock starts “when facts come into existence that
authorize claimant to seek a judicial remedy,”207 the court determined
that Plaintiffs’ unlimited rights in groundwater were curtailed as soon
as the Act became effective on December 30, 1996;208 therefore, that date
should be the starting point.209 The opinion explained using the date of
EAA’s final application determination would render the statute of limitations meaningless.210
For the Equal Protection claim, citing Barshop, the court stated
that the decision to give preference to historic users is “rational and
reasonably related to the State’s legitimate goal of precluding increased
demand.”211 Disagreeing with the Plaintiffs’ reading of Day,212 it held that
while the comparison of water users to other mineral interests might be
appropriate to evaluate a compensable taking, the two are not similarly
situated for Equal Protection purposes.213 The court explained that
Plaintiffs were in the same class as other users who submitted Declarations of Historical Use after December 30, 1996, and they were not
treated differently than anyone else in the class.214
The court also dismissed the Due Process claim, applying a
rational basis test.215 The district court’s rulings were affirmed by the
Fifth Circuit.216 Overall, the case can be seen as an approval that permit
application deadlines, such as those dictated by the EAAA, are acceptable limitations on new landowners and one example of a regulation to

204

Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Petition at 5, GG
Ranch, Ltd., No. SA-14-CV-00848.
205
GG Ranch, slip op. at *7.
206
Id. (quoting Johnson & Higgins v. Kenneco Energy, 962 S.W.2d 507, 514 (Tex. 1998)).
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id. The court distinguished this fact pattern from Bragg because in that case all
permit applications were filed timely.
210
Id. at *7–8.
211
GG Ranch, slip op. at *4.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id. at *5.
215
Id. at *5–6.
216
GG Ranch, Ltd. v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 639 F. App’x 269, 270 (5th Cir. 2016).
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which the right of capture is subject without necessitating compensation.217 In East Texas, a slightly different takings claim arose.218
Mountain Pure is a water bottling company in Palestine, Texas.219
Despite its active spring water bottling operations, it refused to apply for
permits to operate a well or transfer water, nor did it file any required
reports related to pumping.220 Its argument for this refusal was that the
district lacked authority because the water was captured from an “underground formation from which water flowed naturally to the surface
of the earth”221 and, therefore, was not within the purview of Chapter
36.222 The Neches and Trinity Valleys Groundwater Conservation District
(“NTVGCD”), believing that Mountain Pure was utilizing groundwater
from a well, filed suit to compel compliance with district rules.223 Rules
listed included requiring permit applications, cessation of pumping from
nonexempt wells, submission of pumping reports, and payment of production fees.224 Mountain Pure filed a counterclaim for a takings.225
What makes this case unique from the other takings claims is
that it is not based on a permit denial.226 The condemnation action cited
by Mountain Pure was the enforcement action itself, despite the fact that
the issue of whether NTVGCD had authority over the company was still
a pending matter.227 Mountain Pure claimed the NTVGCD’s initial
enforcement action caused its tenant, Ice River, to abandon the contract
and the loss of profit was a regulatory taking compensable under the
Fifth Amendment.228 Groundwater districts already grappling with
understanding regulatory takings limits were now faced with the possibility of being subject to such claims for the simple application of rules
that were otherwise constitutional.229
217

See id.; GG Ranch, slip op. at *8.
See Neches & Trinity Valleys Groundwater Conservation Dist. v. Mountain Pure, TX,
LLC, No. 12-19-00172-CV, 2019 WL 4462677, at *2–3 (Tex. App., Sept. 18, 2019) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
219
Id. at *2.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id. at *1–3.
223
Id. at *2.
224
Mountain Pure, No. 12-19-00172-CV, 2019 WL 4462677, at *2.
225
Id. at *2–3. Mountain Pure’s counterclaim also included a claim for tortious interference
with contracts relating to its tenant citing the same facts. That claim will not be discussed here.
226
Compare id. at *2–3, with Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 814 (Tex. 2012).
227
Mountain Pure, No. 12-19-00172-CV, 2019 WL 4462677, at *6.
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Id.
229
See, e.g., id.
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Plaintiff filed several pleas to the jurisdiction, including governmental immunity and requested dismissal of Mountain Pure’s counterclaims.230 Plaintiff’s plea was denied as to the takings claim.231 On an
interlocutory appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals evaluated the harm
claimed by applying both the total economic and partial economic deprivations tests.232 The court evaluated the current value of the plant,
Mountain Pure’s continued access to its property, its ability to bottle
water, and the lack of a presented argument demonstrating the fine was
onerous.233 Stating that “the United States Supreme Court has observed
neither a diminution in property value nor a ‘substantial reduction or the
attractiveness of the property to potential purchasers’ will suffice to establish that a taking has occurred,” the court reversed the trial court, holding that no takings had occurred and remanded for further proceedings.234
Mountain Pure then filed a petition for review to the Supreme
Court of Texas,235 presenting the following two takings issues:
1.

230

Resolving a split of authority over Carlson,236 can
a regulatory takings claim be based on the government’s intentional but erroneous application of

Id. at *1, *3.
Id. at *1.
232
Id. at *7–8.
233
Mountain Pure, No. 12-19-00172-CV, 2019 WL 4462677, at *7–8.
234
Id. at *7–9. An amicus brief was submitted by over ten GCDs expressing concerns
about the implications of expanding inverse condemnation to procedural actions stating
that “such a holding would strip groundwater conservation districts (such as Amici) of
vital protections afforded them under the governmental immunity doctrine.” Brief of
Amicus Curiae, Harris-Galveston Subsidence Dist., et al. Supporting Appellant at 4,
Mountain Pure, No. 12-19-00172-CV, 2019 WL 4462677.
235
Petition of Review for Petitioner at 1, Mountain Pure, No. 12-19-00172-CV, 2019 WL
4462677.
236
See City of Houston v. Carlson, 451 S.W.3d 828, 829–33 (Tex. 2014). Carlson is a Texas
takings case in which a group of condominium owners were ordered by the City of
Houston to vacate the property due to unsafe conditions. The owners brought an inverse
condemnation action for the code enforcement action that forced them to vacate, thus
depriving them of their property. Plaintiffs did not challenge any of the ordinances upon
which the enforcement action was based. The court held a taking was not appropriate
based upon a procedural challenge, objecting “only to the penalty imposed and the manner
in which the city enforced its standards.” While the court and the City agreed that the
action did interfere with the use and enjoyment of their property, stating that would be
true of any civil enforcement action, it concluded that this impact was not for the purpose
of a public use under the Fifth Amendment.
231

382

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

2.

[Vol. 46:355

property-use restrictions to a landowner’s existing
and permitted use of property?237
Does a temporary regulatory taking occur when
the government wrongly brings a regulatory action
and unreasonably interferes with the landowner’s
existing and permitted use of property?238

In their petition, Mountain Pure recognized the authority issue
has not yet been resolved, but requested the Court resolve what is perceived as a split on interpretations for the Carlson case and determine
whether a taking can extend to the application of a property-use restriction rather than the restriction itself.239 The second issue, related to a
temporary taking, is dependent on the court’s decision in the first
issue.240 On September 3, 2021, the Texas Supreme Court denied the
petition for review.241
Across the state, in West Texas, a groundwater battle continues,
involving the infamous Clayton Williams’ water right in Fort Stockton.242
This most recent dispute started in 2009 when the Williams family, through
their company Fort Stockton Holdings (“FSH”), requested a transfer permit from the Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation District (“Middle
Pecos”) in order to sell FSH’s groundwater to the Permian Basin.243 FSH
holds a historic and existing use permit for approximately 47,000 acre-feet
that was received when Middle Pecos was first formed.244 Under district
rules, historic water can only be used for irrigation and cannot be transferred for a different use or exported with additional permitting.245 For
this reason, the application sought was for a new permit that would allow
237

Petition for Review at x, Mountain Pure, No. 12-19-00172-CV, 2019 WL 4462677.
Id.
239
Id. at 8–10.
240
Id. at 12.
241
See generally Notice of Denial of Petition for Review, Mountain Pure, No. 12-19-00172-CV.
242
Brandon Mulder, Clayton Williams’ Pipe Dreams—Litigation Resumes in Years-Long
Water Fight, MRT (Sept. 20, 2015), https://www.mrt.com/news/article/Clayton-Williams
-pipe-dreams-litigation-7413615.php [https://perma.cc/3XKV-9HA7]; see also Pecos Co.
Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 503 (Tex. App. 1954).
243
Mulder, supra note 242.
244
Id. Full use of the permit would result in removal of “more than 15,449,780 gallons
annually and total more than 463 trillion gallons over the life of the 30-year permit.”
Julian Aguilar, Fort Stockton vs. Claytie, TEX. TRIBUNE (Apr. 21, 2012, 5:00 AM), https://
www.texastribune.org/2010/04/21/fort-stockton-challenges-williams-over-water-use/
[https://perma.cc/Q8P5-KSPA].
245
Aguilar, supra note 244.
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a transfer of the portion of the water not being used for agriculture.246
Because a new permit would expand their total right if granted, FSH
requested a special condition to reduce the use of their historic permit
and ensure total pumping would not exceed their current water right.247
In its denial of the permit, Middle Pecos cited concerns about well
impacts and potential aquifer dewatering.248 Publicly, the Williams family
argued that there should not be a distinction made in the use of the water,
and they did not see a difference between water being exported in a pipe
and water exported as alfalfa, and any attempt to limit use of their permitted water is a violation of their property right in it.249 Jeff Williams
contended that exporting the water to a city may result in a more beneficial use than growing water intensive crops in the desert.250
After a lengthy administrative appeal process, FSH filed a claim
in court.251 In the complaint, Plaintiff made several assertions of error
related to Middle Pecos’s misapplication of the law and challenged the
district’s findings of fact based on substantial evidence.252 In the alternative, FSH brought a taking claim.253 The claim for compensation is dependent on Middle Pecos’s permit decision being affirmed.254 FSH argued
that if the permit denial is appropriate, adequate payment should be
allocated to them for the resulting destruction of property;255 however,
the pleading did not include any application of the facts to the Penn
Central factors or other takings jurisprudence.256
In 2017, before the claim could be fully litigated in appeal, a settlement was reached between FSH and Middle Pecos.257 In exchange for
an export permit, FSH agreed to relinquish historical use permits with

246

Mulder, supra note 242.
Id.
248
Id.
249
From Hell to Heaven, OUR DESIRED FUTURE, http://www.ourdesiredfuture.com/from
-hell-to-heaven.html [https://perma.cc/XE4Q-9WF9] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
250
Id.
251
Mulder, supra note 242.
252
Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 12–25, Fort Stockton Holdings L.P. v. Middle Pecos
Groundwater Conservation Dist., No. 08-15-00382-CV, 2017 WL 2570934 (Tex. Ct. App.
June 14, 2017).
253
Id. at *25.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Marta L. Weismann, Texas Districts Approve Water Project Permits, J. WATER (Nov. 20,
2017), https://journalofwater.com/jow/texas-districts-approve-water-project-permits/ [https://
perma.cc/WV8V-A8P6].
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more protections against pumping restrictions and accepted a new management approach for how the district could restrict their property right
when aquifer levels are low.258 The export permit allows 16 million gallons to be exported each day.259 In May 2020, an interlocal agreement
was entered into by the cities of Abilene, San Angelo, and Midland to
purchase water from Williams’s Fort Stockton Holdings.260
The Lost Pines GCD (“Lost Pines”) found itself in a similar struggle.261 In May 2013, it denied a request from Forestar Real Estate Group
(“Forestar”) for a permit to pump 45,000 acre-feet per year to sell water
to Hays County.262 To support the project, Forestar obtained leases across
20,000 acres of land and expended $15 million to procure the leases and
pay for aquifer studies and experts.263 Lost Pines only permitted 12,000
acre-feet per year, which threatened the project.264 Using many of the
same arguments as seen in similar cases, Forestar filed a lawsuit to challenge the GCD’s decision, claiming the district made Chapter 36 errors
as well as Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment violations.265 Again, the takings argument was short and only cited to the ownership interest purportedly created by Day and Bragg and did not include a full takings
analysis.266 The financial harm cited was the loss of the municipal water
project caused by the smaller permit amount.267 Like the Fort Stockton
case,268 this dispute was settled out of court.269
258

Id.
Id.
260
Jamie Burch, Cities of Abilene, San Angelo, Midland Voting Tuesday on Agreement for
New Water Source, KTXS 12 ABC (May 10, 2020), https://ktxs.com/news/local/cities-of-abi
lene-san-angelo-entering-into-agreement-with-midland-for-new-water-source [https://
perma.cc/558A-VECE]. After the settlement was reached, Cockrell Investment Partners
sued twice to block the Williams’s project with Abilene, Midland, and San Angelo. The
second claim is still pending. As of the writing of this piece, it is unclear how this lawsuit
will affect the project.
261
Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition at 1–2, Forestar (USA) Real Est. Grp., Inc. v. Lost
Pines Groundwater Conservation Dist., No. 15369 (335th Dist. Ct. Lee County, Tex.
Mar. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Forestar Plaintiff’s Amended Petition].
262
Id.
263
Id. at 2.
264
Id.
265
Id. State constitutional claims that mirror the federal ones were also included.
266
Compare id. at 4–6, with Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 25, Fort Stockton Holdings
L.P. v. Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation Dist., No. 08-15-00382-CV, 2017 WL
2570934 (Tex. Ct. App. June 14, 2017).
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Forestar Plaintiff’s Amended Petition, supra note 261, at 39.
268
See Fort Stockton Holdings, L.P. v. Middle Pecos Groundwater Conservation Dist., No.
08-15-00382-CV, 2017 WL 2570934, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. June 14, 2017).
269
Andy Sevilla, Lost Pines Groundwater District approves Forestar water permit,
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Although the Williams and Forestar cases never made it to a takings
adjudication, the fact pattern is worth mentioning here as yet another
example of the types of claims that are pervasive.270 Specifically, claims
in which the plaintiff is a denied permit applicant and the district is forced
to defend their legal ability to the permitting decision without owing compensation.271 As litigation against GCDs increases, other legal claims are
becoming increasingly frequent.272
B.

Equal Protection

As discussed above, courts are increasingly asked to provide clarity
about the vested property right as it relates to the districts’ authorized
police power to regulate,273 but these Fifth Amendment challenges often
include other constitutional claims.274 A common corollary assertion is a
violation of a landowner’s Equal Protection.275 Equal Protection has
actually been litigated throughout the history of Texas’ groundwater
regulatory conflicts.276 When districts attempt to categorize types of
water users to permit, winners and losers often result.277 Equal Protection challenges turn on the definition of the class in which the plaintiff
is included and the rational basis for the distinction in treatment.278
STATESMAN, https://www.statesman.com/NEWS/20160828/Lost-Pines-Groundwater-Dis
trict-approves-Forestar-water-permit [https://perma.cc/3Q6J-8W89] (last visited Jan. 12,
2022).
270
Forestar Plaintiff’s Amended Petition, supra note 261, at 2.
271
Id.
272
See Gregory M. Ellis et al., Emerging Legal Issues, TEX. ALL. GROUNDWATER DIST.,
https://texasgroundwater.org/policy/emerging-legal-issues/ [https://perma.cc/G99W-LMME]
(last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
273
See discussion supra Part I.
274
See, e.g., Forestar Plaintiff’s Amended Petition, supra note 261, at 2.
275
Emily Willms Rogers et al., Water Rights: Groundwater Permitting, STATE BAR TEX:
TEX. ENV’T L.J. (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.texenrls.org/articles/vol-51-1-water-rights/
[https://perma.cc/Y2VL-8NSZ].
276
Michael J. Booth & Ross Richard-Crow, Regulatory Dance: Rule of Capture and Chapter
36 District Perspective Texas Water Development Board, in REPORT 361 CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 100 YEARS OF RULE OF CAPTURE: FROM EAST TO GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT
19, 24 (2004).
277
See Beckendorff v. Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence Dist., 558 S.W.2d 75, 80 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977).
278
Under Chapter 36 surface owners will be treated differently based on where they are
located as each GCD has authority to pass independent regulations. Gerald Torres,
Liquid Assets: Groundwater in Texas, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 143, 152–53, 157–58 (2012).
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Early Equal Protection Claims

As seen in the Fifth Amendment discussion, the EAA has generated conflict since its inception.279 Although the more recent cases focused
on the Fifth Amendment, one of the first conflicts for the district related
to Equal Protection,280 an issue that has re-emerged in recent litigation.281 The contention that similarly situated people are being treated
differently is not new to groundwater litigation.282 In Barshop v. Medina
Cnty. Underground Water Conservation District,283 plaintiff landowners
challenged the constitutionality of the EAA’s permitting system.284 The
plaintiffs complained that certain provisions of the EAAA were facially
invalid.285 Plaintiffs also claimed the EAAA was an unconstitutional
violation of their Equal Protection by allowing existing users to apply for
historic permits, the Act discriminated against landowners who did not
withdraw water before the historic period.286
The Texas Supreme Court held that the EAAA was not a facially
invalid infringement on landowners’ constitutional property rights.287
The court recognized the apparent conflict between right of capture and
the state’s regulation of groundwater withdrawals.288 While upholding
the rules as facially valid, the court agreed that as applied challenges
could be considered differently, stating, “[t]he issue of when a particular
regulation becomes an invasion of property rights in underground water
is complex and multi-faceted.”289 Sixteen years later, the Texas Supreme
Court ruled on that specific issue.290
Turning to the Equal Protection claim, the court applied a rational basis test and held that no such violation had occurred.291 The court
explained that allowing historical use permits to be issued before new
users was rationally and reasonably related to the Legislature’s stated

279

See, e.g., Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 342 F. App’x 43, 44 (5th Cir. 2009).
See Beckendorff, 558 S.W.2d at 80.
281
See Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618,
625 (Tex. 1996).
282
Id. at 632–33.
283
Id.
284
Id. at 625.
285
Id. at 628.
286
Id. at 631.
287
Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 623.
288
Id. at 626.
289
Id.
290
See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 421 S.W.3d 118, 118 (Tex. App. 2013).
291
See Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 631–32.
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goal of precluding increased demand in the aquifer while protecting existing users.292 Because the Edwards had a pumping cap, existing users
had an opportunity to claim their right and additional permits could be
issued for existing permitted withdrawals.293 This case provided critical
information about how GCDs could constitutionally treat existing users
differently from new users.294 In addition to Barshop, many of the recent
cases cite to another early case to take on this issue: Guitar Holding Co.
v. Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation District.295
As GCDs expanded their regulations questions regarding the extent
to which districts could constitutionally regulate also grew.296 In Guitar
Holding Co. v. Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation District,
the local GCD’s permitting scheme was challenged by a landowner.297 The
Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation District No. 1’s
(Hudspeth County)298 2002 management plan was intended to protect the
Bone Springs–Victorio Peak Aquifer at historically optimal levels.299
This plan “recognize[d] three types of permits: (1) validation permits, (2) operating permits, and (3) transfer permits.”300 Validation permits were issued to existing wells that were shown to have produced
water during a defined period.301 Historic use determined the quantity of
water that could be permitted.302 Landowners who irrigated during the
historic period could receive a validation permit of four acre-feet of water
per acre irrigated, which could be reduced to three acre-feet.303 Landowners that did not historically irrigate were entitled to a permit equal to

292

Id. at 632.
See Bragg, 421 S.W.3d. at 125.
294
See Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 632.
295
Guitar Holding Co. v. Hudspeth Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 263
S.W.3d 910, 910 (Tex. 2008).
296
GEOLOGICAL SOC’Y OF AM., THE EDWARDS AQUIFER: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
OF A VITAL WATER RESOURCE 195 (John Malcolm Sharp et al. eds., 2019).
297
Guitar, 263 S.W.3d at 910.
298
This groundwater district is located in far West Texas, less than one hundred miles east
of El Paso. This area is extremely dry with very little precipitation to provide surface
watering or recharge opportunities. Despite annual rainfall of only eight to ten inches, this
region had a historic agricultural economy made possible by groundwater irrigation. Id.
at 913.
299
Id. at 913. In 2000, prior to these new rules, the state auditor questioned whether the
district was successfully managing the aquifer.
300
Id. at 914. Operating permits, although authorized, had limited value because they
could not be used unless water rose above pre-irrigation levels.
301
Id.
302
Id.
303
Guitar, 263 S.W.3d at 914.
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“the maximum amount of water beneficially used in any one year during
the [historic] period.”304 This system permitted water based solely on how
water was used in the past and did not consider of the future intents of
a landowner.305
Transfer permits were available to anyone holding a validation or
operating permit, but there was a higher standard for those applying for
completely new permits as compared to those holding validation
permits.306 Guitar Holding Company, a large non-irrigating landowner,
was eligible for fewer water permits than nearby irrigators because they
could demonstrate higher water usage during the historic period.307 Under
this system, a historic irrigator seeking to sell and transport water out
of the district could gain a permit to pump more water than another
historic non-irrigator with the same intention.308 Guitar argued that this
was an illegal distinction based on “use.”309
Guitar’s interpretation of Texas Water Code Section 36.116(b) was
that a district is authorized to preserve an existing use of the same type
or purpose.310 The court reasoned that, “[b]ecause transferring water out
of the district is a new use [for anyone seeking such a permit,] it cannot
be preserved or ‘grandfathered’ under [the] section,”311 and all those
applying for transfer permits should be treated equally as new users.312
Therefore, linking the transfer permits to existing permits was a violation of Section 36.116(b) and is outside the authority given to GCDs.313
Hudspeth County argued that Section 36.116(b) granted the authority to
preserve historic or existing use “makes sense only if ‘use’ refers to an
amount of groundwater, not its purpose.”314
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that historic use should only
apply to the exact use and location for which it had been used.315 If either
304

Id.
Id. at 912.
306
Id. at 913.
307
Id. at 914–15.
308
Id. at 912. To obtain a transfer permit, a landowner must first have a validation
permit. Id. at 914.
309
Brief for Petitioner at 12, Guitar Holding Co. v. Hudspeth Cnty. Underground Water
Conservation Dist., 263 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. 2008).
310
Guitar, 263 S.W.3d at 915.
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
Id.
314
Id.
315
Id. at 916. This is a statutorily allowable factor to consider in limiting groundwater
production by a district. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.116(b) (West 2015).
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of those changed, the permit holder had to be treated like any other new
applicant.316 Because no one had ever transferred water out of the basin,
all transfers should be considered new uses with no prior use credited
through validation permits.317 GCDs are still permitted to distinguish
between uses for the purposes of a historic and existing permit.318 GCDs
are limited to their treatment of existing permit holders seeking to sell
and transport their water.319 Ultimately, the perceived unfairness of lost
transfer sale earnings may have driven the decision.320
2.

Modern Equal Protection Claims

In a newer EAA case, landowners David Stratta and Anthony
Fazzino sued the Brazos Valley Groundwater Conservation District
(“BVGCD”), claiming that BVGCD violated both the Equal Protection
and takings clauses by allowing the City of Bryan (“City”) to drain the
water under their property.321 Unlike the GG Ranch and Mountain Pure
cases,322 this case made a more detailed argument about how they were
treated differently.323
Pursuant to the authority granted in Chapter 36 of the Texas
Water Code,324 BVGCD promulgated permitting rules for production from
the Simsboro aquifer in 2004.325 These rules included three categories of
wells: (1) Existing Wells; (2) New Wells; and (3) Wells with Historic Use326
and regulated how much water could be pumped through spacing and
316

Guitar, 263 S.W.3d at 917.
Id. at 917–18.
318
Id. at 917.
319
Id. at 918.
320
Id.
321
Stratta v. Roe, 961 F.3d 340, 346 (5th Cir. 2020). Stratta raised a First Amendment
claim that will not be discussed here. Id. Other recent Texas water cases such as GG
Ranch have raised Equal Protection claims without developing arguments such as those
seen in Stratta. See generally GG Ranch, Ltd. v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. SA-14-CV
-00848, 2015 BL 255526, slip op. (W.D. Tex. June 2, 2015).
322
See GG Ranch, Ltd. v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 639 F. App’x 269, 270 (5th Cir. 2016);
Neches & Trinity Valleys Groundwater Conservation Dist. v. Mountain Pure, TX, LLC,
No. 12-19-00172-CV, 2019 WL 4462677, at *2–3 (Tex. App. Sept. 18, 2019) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).
323
Stratta, 961 F.3d at 360–61.
324
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.101(a), (c) (West 2019).
325
Rules of the Brazos Valley Groundwater Conservation District §§ 7.1(1)–(3) (published
Dec. 1, 2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20041208021448fw_/http://www.brazosvalley
gcd.org/id75. [https://perma.cc/3UBZ-JBBB].
326
Id. § 8.3(g).
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production limits.327 The stated goal of these rules was to “minimize as
far as practicable the drawdown of the water table and the reduction of
artesian pressure, to control subsidence, to prevent interference between
wells, to prevent degradation of water quality, and to prevent waste.”328
Rule 7.1 set maximum allowable production regulations for new wells
using a calculation that considered acreage land owned or controlled by
the owner or operator.329 Like many other districts, permits for Wells
with Historic Use are generally based on the amount an owner can prove
was beneficially used before the rules’ effective date.330 Existing Wells
are wells “for which drilling or significant development of the well”
predates the rules’ effective date;331 however, no clear production limits
were established for these wells.332
After the rules took effect, the City of Bryan started to drill on its
2.7 acre tract.333 The well was completed ten months later.334 “In June
2006, the City applied for a permit to operate [the well] at a production
rate of 3,000 GPM.”335 This request was conditionally granted authorizing production of 4,838 acre-feet annually at a rate of 3,000 GPM in
February of 2007.336 The City received an updated identical conditional
permit in April 2013.337 In January 2017, ten years after the granting of
the first permit to the City, Fazzino filed his complaint with the District,
requesting a hearing and a revocation of City’s permit.338 In the alternative, he requested the District initiate proceedings to amend the permit
and limit the City’s production of water.339
One factual issue is the characterization of this well. Because it
was not producing water on December 2, 2004, when the rules went into
effect, it could not be considered a historic use;340 however, it also was not

327

Id. §§ 6–7.
Id. § 6.1.
329
Id. § 7.1(2).
330
Id. § 1.1(16).
331
Rules of the Brazos Valley Groundwater Conservation District § 1.1(12) (published
Dec. 1, 2004), https://web.archive.org/web/20041208021448fw_/http://www.brazosvalley
gcd.org/id75.htm [https://perma.cc/3UBZ-JBBB].
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Stratta v. Roe, 961 F.3d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 2020).
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Id.
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Stratta, 961 F.3d at 347–48.
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technically an existing well because they had not completed significant
development by the time required.341 Fazzino argued that it should be
permitted as a new well, which would have capped the production at 192
GPM based on the acreage City owned.342 In addition to arguing that the
production permitted was not allowed for a new well, the location of the
well’s cone of depression impacted adjacent wells.343
Fazzino’s complaint was ultimately referred to the State Office of
Administrative Hearings (“SOAH”) for adjudication.344 City argued in
part that BVGCD lacked legal authority to initiate an involuntary permit
amendment proceeding based on a complaint.345 SOAH agreed, stating
that, “[n]o provision of law authorizes someone other than the District to
file a complaint with the District to challenge the legality of someone
else’s permit or to seek revocation or amendment of it. . . . Moreover, no
statute authorizes the District to rule on such a complaint if one is filed.”346
On these grounds, SOAH dismissed Fazzino’s complaint.347
After the failed attempt at SOAH, Fazzino applied for an offset
well permit.348 His request was denied twice for not being able to show
he owned the acreage required for a 3,000 GPM well.349 Fazzino filed a
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action claiming that he was treated differently
than similarly situated applicants in violation of Equal Protection.350 First,
Fazzino argued that City’s well was mischaracterized and it should have
341

Id. at 348, 361.
Id. at 348.
343
Id. A cone of depression is drawdown that is created when more water is withdrawn
from an aquifer than water flowing into an aquifer as recharge, causing less water to be
available for pumping. Bruce Lesikar et al., Questions About Groundwater Conservation
Districts in Texas, TEX. A&M AGRILIFE EXTENSION, https://agrilifeextension.tamu.edu/li
brary/water/questions-about-groundwater-conservation-districts-in-texas/#:~:text=A%20
cone%20of%20depression%20is,therefore%2C%20groundwater%20levels%20are%20lo
wered.&text=You%20can%20still%20use%20the,your%20pump%20to%20draw%20water
[https://perma.cc/XE44-HDKW] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022). Well spacing in relation to
hydrologic characteristics and pump size can prevent interference between neighboring
wells. Id.
344
Proposal for Decision on Summary Disposition at 2, Complaint of the Brazos Valley
Groundwater Rts. Ass’n and Tony Fazzino Against the City of Bryan, SOAH No. 960-17
-4513 (SOAH Hearing Nov. 14, 2017).
345
Id. at 6.
346
Id. Texas rules authorize a permit holder to request a district to amend their own
operating permit, and a district can initiate an amendment to an operating permit in
accordance with their rules. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.1146(a), (c) (2015).
347
Id. at 6, 11.
348
Stratta, 961 F.3d at 348.
349
Id.
350
Id. at 360.
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been designated as a New Well and thus subject to the acreage equation.351
Second, he argued that the BVGCD did not enforce their rules on land
ownership, spacing, and production limited for the City, while enforcing
them rigorously against him without any rational basis for the discrepancy.352 The result of this alleged preferential treatment was a significant
difference in permissive pumping quantities.353
The district court dismissed the case on a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion
filed by BVGCD for three reasons.354 First, the court held that the district
was immune from federal suits under the Eleventh Amendment by categorizing them as an extension of the state, thus making them sovereign.355
They also held the issue was not ripe and that the takings claim was
subject to a Burford abstention.356 Without a clear definition of the rights
Fazzino had in groundwater, a case could not progress to the merits.357
Fazzino appealed the ruling to the Fifth Circuit.358
In May 2020, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion disagreeing with
the trial court.359 First, the appellate court held that Texas law limits
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity to state agencies that act as
an “alter ego” or “arm of the state.”360 Using case law, in part by analogizing
navigation districts and focusing on district’s rulemaking autonomy, it was
determined that groundwater districts are sufficiently distinct from the
state to be outside its protections and, therefore, subject to federal suits.361
The court made quick work of overturning the trial court’s ruling
in regards to ripeness.362 In noting that the primary case on which the
district court relied had been overturned, the court stated that a takings
case is ripe when the complainant has exhausted their administrative
351

Id. at 360–61.
Id. at 361.
353
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Stratta, 961 F.3d at 346, 349.
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Id. at 346, 349–50.
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Id. at 346, 349–50, 356; Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co. 517 U.S. 706, 726 (1996)
(“Burford allows a federal court to dismiss a case only if it presents ‘difficult questions
of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar,’ or if its adjudication in a federal forum
‘would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter
of substantial public concern.’”(quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989))).
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Id. at 350.
361
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remedies and potentially suffered a violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights.363 Because Fazzino had done this, the case was ripe.364 Finally, the
court turned to the Burford abstention argument.365 Applying the Burford
factors,366 and citing the Day case holding, the court held that the claim
brought forth by Fazzino was sufficiently appropriate under federal and
state law to proceed.367
Once all of the jurisdictional merits were overturned, the Fifth
Circuit turned to the merits of the claims.368 Reviewing the ownership
law created by the Day case and stating that uncertainty remained regarding the status of the property right,369 the opinion tasks the trial court
to assess whether BVGCD’s regulations resulted in a takings of Fazzino’s
property interest.370 Similarly, the court pointed to the need for adjudication of the Equal Protection claim on the merits to determine: (1)
whether Fazzino was “intentionally treated differently from others who
were similarly situated”; and (2) whether there was a “rational basis” for
this distinction.371
Justice Jones provided some indication of how this test should be
applied in the groundwater context.372 Citing case law, she began by
stating all factors that an “objectively reasonable . . . decisionmaker would
have found relevant” can be considered in the inquiry.373 Specific to this
case are the evaluations that a GCD must consider when promulgating
their rules of property including rights in groundwater, the public interest,
and the requirement for fairness and impartiality.374 One purpose of the
rules, as defined by Day, was to provide property owners with a fair share
of the reservoir.375 After describing the specifics of Fazzino’s Equal Protection claim, the case was remanded for an adjudication on the merits.376
In August 2021, the district court on remand granted the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment thus denying Fazzino’s equal

363
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protection claim.377 The court held that Fazzino failed to identify a “class”
from whom he was treated differently.378 The court explained that even
as a “class-of-one” he was obligated to support his assertions of disparate
treatment by providing some facts analogizing himself with others.379
Instead, the only facts that appeared to relate him with the City of Bryan
was land ownership and a request for production permits, but the court
stated those similarities dissipated in light of all the surrounding facts.380
Although this determination would have disposed of the matter, the court
continued their evaluation and held that Fazzino’s claim also fails on the
rational basis test even if a class could have been established.381
Under this review standard, a governmental decision can only be
invalidated if there is no conceivable scenario that provides a rational basis
for its existence.382 The court looked at Chapter 36’s directive for districts
to “balance the interests of constitutionally protected private property
rights, with the increasingly zero-sum water supply of the state of Texas”
to validate BVGCD’s regulations.383 Citing Guitar, Judge Manske stated
that rules treating “existing wells” differently from “new wells” have a
rational basis.384 It is also permissible for GCDs to treat pre-existing
municipal water suppliers differently from new, individual groundwater
applicants.385 Reiterating that property rights in groundwater are not
unlimited, the court reviewed the authority and the responsibility of
groundwater districts to manage withdrawals and stated that one applicant receiving more water than another does not automatically qualify
as impermissible discrimination.386
In most of the post-Day groundwater litigation, the landowner
seeking the permit is challenging the inability to access all the water
requested.387 This imbues those wishing to pump, often large amounts of
water, with a more powerful property interest simply because of threat of

377

Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at *1, Stratta v.
Roe, No. 6:18-CV-00114-ADA, 2021 WL 1199634 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2021).
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Id. at *4.
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Id. at *4–5.
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Id. at *5.
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Id. at *6.
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Id. at *7.
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Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at *1, Stratta v.
Roe, No. 6:18-CV-00114-ADA, 2021 WL 1199634 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2021).
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Id. at *8.
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Id. at *9.
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Id.
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Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. 06-11-18170, 2011 WL 12548554, at *1 (Tex.
Dist. Mar. 25, 2011).

2022] NEW STRATEGIES FOR GROUNDWATER LITIGATION IN TEXAS

395

an inverse condemnation claim.388 Unfortunately, this only represents a
small fraction of landowners.389 Existing law should also be used to
represent the property interests of landowners with different economic
goals.390 As more landowners seek to stop drainage and concerns about
the protection of groundwater aquifers grow,391 there is an opportunity to
review the authority given to districts by the legislature to shift the power
away from permit seekers and back to the other stated goals in Chapter 36.
IV.

NEW LITIGATION STRATEGIES

After the courts’ rulings in Day and Bragg, legal conversations
focused on GCD regulatory limits to avoid unconstitutionally infringing
on property rights.392 The irony of the Day opinion being hailed as a
property rights victory was that it was only a victory for some property
rights holders. Unfortunately, not everyone who lives within a groundwater district wants to pump large quantities of water.393 One of the prongs
in the Penn Central takings test is to assess the reasonably backed economic expectations of the person seeking compensation,394 but landowners who have the reasonable expectation to keep water under their land
for future generations are at a legal disadvantage.395 Like oil and gas law,
all landowners have an equal right to drain and profit from their subsurface
estate,396 but unlike oil and gas, groundwater has value in place.397 This
sentiment is reflected in the conservation amendment and throughout
Chapter 36.398
While legislation may also be needed to protect some landowners
and groundwater itself, many of these issues will be resolved in the
courts. Because the property interest in groundwater was vested by a

388
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court,399 the limits of that interest will likely be defined through litigation over a period of time.400 Determining the limits of regulation is not
the only reason that litigation will increase.401 As the demand for groundwater increase and supplies decrease,402 the management decisions of
GCDs will be examined through lawsuits to determine if they are in
compliance with Chapter 36 requirements.403
A.

Conservation and Protection: Obligations of GCDs

Groundwater Conservation Districts were created by the authority of the conservation amendment for the purpose of protecting groundwater resources on behalf of the people of Texas.404 To fully appreciate
the depth of that legal obligation, one must evaluate the plain meaning
of the amendment and the regulations that govern GCDs within the
context of their adoption.405
1.

Conservation Amendment and the Public Trust

The focus on the property rights vested by Day pulls attention
from the equally important aspect of groundwater management in most
areas of the state: groundwater districts.406 Much like cities are delegated
the police power to restrict private property uses for the good of the
whole,407 GCDs are authorized and obligated to limit pumping as needed
to protect other users, surface water, the environment, and the aquifer
to ensure the survival of communities.408
The source of GCDs’ authority is the conservation amendment,
which elevates the importance of protecting Texas’ natural resources.409
“[T]he preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the
399

Stratta v. Roe, 961 F.3d 340, 359 (5th Cir. 2020).
Water Rights in Texas, TEX. PUB. POL’Y FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.texas
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See discussion infra Sections IV.A.1–4.
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TEX. ALL. GROUNDWATER DISTS., Groundwater Management through Groundwater
Conservation Districts, in 365 TEX. WATER DEV. BD. REP. 299, 299–303 (Robert Mace et
al. eds., 2006).
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T.S. Baumgardner, “Takings” under the Police Power—The Development of Inverse Condemnation as Method of Challenging Zoning Ordinances, 30 SMU L.J. 723, 723 (1976).
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WATER § 36.207 (West 2019).
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State are each and all hereby declared public rights and duties.”410 This
statement vested the waters of Texas into the public trust long before
they became the domain of public property rights.411 This is not to say
that private rights do not exist, but they do not exist in a vacuum.412
Because groundwater districts are a result of state constitutional authority,413 GCDs must regulate in a way that protects the public’s interest in
these resources.414
The concept of the public trust is reflected clearly throughout
Texas law,415 but it is not unique to the state.416 The seminal U.S. case on
the topic focused on access to surface water.417 In the 1892 Supreme
Court decision, the Court held that under the public trust doctrine, the
state holds the title to the beds of navigable lakes in trust for the use and
benefit of the public and their right of use.418 The state acts as a type of
fiduciary, which limits how these areas can be used and a state cannot
divest itself of its public trust obligation.419 While access to surface water
has often been the focus of the public trust, it is not limited to that.420
Some jurisdictions have expanded the public trust to other common
resources including air, wildlife, and land.421 “Courts have focused less on
the state’s property rights in the lands underlying the water, and more on
410
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Id.
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Texas Water Law, TEX. A&M UNIV., https://texaswater.tamu.edu/water-law [https://
perma.cc/28D4-Y8L7] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
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the state’s duty as trustee to balance private property rights in common
natural resources against the public’s interest in water as a common
natural resource.”422
While groundwater is not specifically enumerated in the Texas
Conservation Amendment, it does state “water” and it would be difficult
to argue that groundwater does not fall within the larger “natural resources” umbrella.423 The inclusion of groundwater is a natural extension
of the tidal waters discussion seen in Illinois Central.424 “The basic public
trust doctrine principle—that some resources are to be shared by all and
managed in a protective capacity for future generations by the sovereign—is particularly well-suited to groundwater.”425
What is included in the public trust varies by state and has evolved
over time.426 In 2000, Hawaii extended the public trust to all waters,
which included groundwater.427 The court relied on two 1978 additions
to the state constitution, which are closely analogous to Texas’ conservation amendment.428 In its decision, the court stated that not including
groundwater would lead to an absurd conclusion due to the related nature
422

Tuholske, supra note 420, at 216.
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a). The inclusion of groundwater is particularly critical for
aquifers that are being mined. In areas like the panhandle of Texas, the vast majority of
domestic and agricultural use, which is the primary economic driver in the area, is served
by the quickly depleting Ogallala Aquifer. Tuholske, supra note 420, at 193–94. An
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have no reliable water substitute. See id.
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In re Water Use Permit Applications (Wai’ Hole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000).
Other states such as New Hampshire and Connecticut have also extended public trust
protections to groundwater. Tuholske, supra note 420, at 220.
428
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its
political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural
beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals,
and energy source shall promote the development and utilization of
these resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in
furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. . . . All public natural
resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.
HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1. In a related provisional amendment, the constitution now
states, “[t]he State has an obligation to protect, control and regulate the use of Hawaii’s
water resources for the benefit of its people.” Id. § 7. During the legislative discussion of
this amendment, the goal was stated that its purpose was “to make clear that our
obligations include the welfare of future generations and therefore in the use of our
resources we must protect our natural resources against irreversible depletion, waste or
destruction . . . .” Wai’ Hole Ditch, 9 P.3d at n.36.
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of surface water and groundwater.429 Even outside this connection, the
court held that groundwater was included within constitutional protections based on their plain meaning.430
Although Hawaii utilizes a different legal management scheme
for groundwater,431 its interpretation and application of their constitutional protections for natural resources can and should be mirrored in
Texas.432 Much like Hawaii, the state of Texas is obligated to protect the
natural resources of the state on behalf of its citizens.433 This can be
accomplished while still respecting vested private property rights.434
The trust alone may not be a solution, but it is a principle that
should guide the management approach of this common resource.435 The
purpose of a trust is to protect the asset for future users rather than
allowing a few private interests to realize a short-term gain.436 “Groundwater mining and over drafting are inconsistent with basic trust duties;
trusts must be managed to preserve trust assets and to fulfill trust purposes.”437 In Texas, districts are the preferred method to achieve this goal.
The conservation amendment alone provides the duty of protection,438 but
detailed obligations are also reflected throughout Chapter 36.439
2.

GCDs’ Statutory Obligations

To find the conservation expectations placed on GCDs, one need
look no further than their stated purpose.440 Section 36.0015 creates
districts in the name of the conservation amendment goals441 and reiterates their purpose to “provide for the conservation, preservation, protection,

429
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recharging and prevention of waste of groundwater . . . .”442 To effectuate
these requirements, districts must create management plans and promulgate rules that are consistent with the plan.443 In its rulemaking, a
district shall “consider the public interest in conservation, preservation,
protection, recharging, and prevention of waste of groundwater, and of
groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions, and in controlling subsidence caused by withdrawal of groundwater from those groundwater
reservoirs or their subdivisions, consistent with the objectives of Section 59,
Article XVI, Texas Constitution.”444 The repetition of the protection and
conservation language throughout the sections pertaining not only to the
goals, but also to the implementation of them, reinforces their importance.
In addition to the broader conservation language found in Chapter
36, the legislature has prescribed specific actions to ensure that this will be
achieved by the districts.445 First, districts must adopt management plans
that incorporate efficient use of groundwater, waste prevention, conjunctive
surface water management, impact on other natural resources, conservation, and the adopted DFCs.446 Many of the same considerations are
listed as part of the joint planning process and in the DFC requirements
themselves.447 The statute states that, “[t]he desired future conditions .
. . must provide a balance between the highest practicable level of groundwater production and the conservation, preservation, protection, recharging, and prevention of waste of groundwater . . . in the management
area.”448 Because districts must adopt rules that implement the management plan, and the management plan must be consistent with DFCs, this
can be read to mean that districts should limit permits when the resource is going to be harmed or these other concerns are involved.449
There are several examples of GCDs who have taken these obligations seriously.450 An early adopter was the Hemphill County GCD.451
Located in the panhandle,452 this single county GCD did not agree with the
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447
Id. § 36.108(c).
448
Id. § 36.108(d-2).
449
Id. § 36.107(f); see id. § 36.1132.
450
See infra notes 482–97 and accompanying text.
451
See TEX. WATER DEV. BD., HEMPHILL CNTY. UNDERGROUND CONSERVATION DIST. MGMT.
PLAN 3 (adopted July 17, 2007) (showing Hemphill proposed initial plan in 2000, shortly
after requirements were put in place).
452
See John B. McFarland, Water Fight in the Texas Panhandle, OIL & GAS LAW. BLOG
443
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DFCs adopted by surrounding GCDs because it wished to protect surface
flows and prevent dewatering for the Ogallala Aquifer in that region.453
The first sentence in their management plan related to the district’s
mission reads, “[t]he Hemphill County Underground Water Conservation
District . . . is committed to managing and protecting the groundwater
resources of Hemphill County.”454 The district’s more conservative DFC
was challenged by T. Boone Pickens, who had purchased water rights in
the district and intended to pump water from the county and transport
it for sale.455 Pickens asked TWDB to reject the DFC, arguing that allowing differing DFCs along political subdivision lines, in this case district
boundaries, violated Chapter 36.456 Because achieving the DFC was
technically feasible, TWDB approved it stating, it did not have authority
to deny it.457 This continues to be the position of the TWDB.458

(Sept. 18, 2010), https://www.oilandgaslawyerblog.com/water-fight-in-the-texas-panha/
[https://perma.cc/5SM9-7JAX].
453
Id. Unlike the more common area DFC of ensuring the aquifer was forty-fifty percent
full in 50 years, Hemphill County adopted a target of eighty percent water remaining.
TEX. WATER DEV. BD., REP. ON APPEAL OF THE REASONABLENESS OF THE DESIRED FUTURE
CONDITIONS ADOPTED BY THE GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTS., in GROUNDWATER
MGMT. AREA 1 FOR THE OGALLALA AND RITA BLANCA AQUIFERS at 8–9 (Feb. 10, 2010).
454
TEX. WATER DEV. BD., supra note 451, at 1.
455
McFarland, supra note 452.
456
See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108(d-1); McFarland, supra note 452. Pickens’s
complaint also included a takings claim, arguing that his property right was devalued
because more generous pumping regulations in neighboring Roberts County would drain
his water. TEX. WATER DEV. BD., supra note 451, at 3. TWDB demurred on this issue,
stating that property rights should be resolved by courts, but they did add this statement
in another section: “The imposition of regulatory constraints is not unreasonable per se.
The issue for the Districts appears to be how to balance competing concerns—environment, ecology, business, recreation, conservation, and development.” Id. at 3, 7.
457
TEX. WATER DEV. BD., supra note 453, at 9.
When staff assesses whether DFCs are physically possible, they assess
whether there is any pumping scenario that would allow the DFCs to be
achieved. If a scenario would allow the DFCs to be achieved, then the
DFCs are considered physically possible. The models, as run by staff
and as described in the Districts’ testimony, demonstrate that the
DFCs are physically possible.
Id. at 8.
458
Pickens’s interest in this legal argument ceased when he sold his water rights to the
Canadian River Municipal Water Authority for $130 million. Betsy Blaney, T. Boone
Pickens Sells Water Rights to Texas Water Supplier for $103 Million, THE OKLAHOMAN
(June 24, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.oklahoman.com/article/3579874/t-boone-pickens
-sells-water-rights-to-texas-water-supplier-for-103-million#:~:text=Pickens
%20and%20his%20Mesa%20Water,the%20worst%20stage%20of%20dryness
[https://perma.cc/7QQ5-VTJZ].
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More recently, the Hays Trinity GCD adopted Rule 15 to protect
water levels in the iconic Jacob’s Well.459 This rule defines the Jacob’s
Well Groundwater Management Zone and sets drought management
protections by establishing permitting criteria, and creating drought and
pumping reductions for nonexempt wells within the Management Zone.460
What makes this rule particularly interesting is the recognition of groundwater management as a tool to protect an important surface water resource.461 This same approach should be used to manage important
spring flows as well as protect surface water permit holders.
In addition to the clear obligations in Chapter 36, courts have
reiterated the districts’ protection imperative.462 As early as East, the
court called for legislative action related to water management and source
protection.463 The court stated, “[i]n the absence of . . . positive authorized
legislation, as between proprietors of adjoining lands, the law recognizes
no correlative rights in respect to underground waters . . . .”464 Since its
passage, many court opinions cite the conservation amendment to underscore the importance and purpose of GCDs.465
In Barshop, the court recognized the district’s constitutional obligation to regulate groundwater.466 “Water regulation is essentially a
legislative function. The [1917 constitutional amendment] recognizes that
preserving and conserving natural resources are public rights and duties.”467 The Supreme Court, in its Sipriano opinion, again cited the Conservation Amendment as ample justification for the regulation of groundwater

459

See HAYS TRINITY GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DIST., DISTRICT RULES § 15 (effective
Mar. 5, 2020). Jacob’s Well is a 140-foot cave filled with spring water. Janie H. Pace, 10
Things to Know Before Exploring Jacob’s Well, TRAVEL AWAITS (Nov. 20, 2020), https://
www.travelawaits.com/2559033/things-to-know-before-exploring-jacobs-well/ [https://
perma.cc/KXB9-RKL2]. In the last twenty years, the well has stopped flowing three times
during droughts due to nearby groundwater extraction. Id.
460
HAYS TRINITY GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DIST., supra note 459, § 15. “Drought
curtailments are mandatory for all permit holders” in the management zone. Id. § 15.2.1.
The amount of curtailment is determined by the 10-day running average flow at Jacob’s
Well. Id. § 15.2.4.
461
The EAAA seeks to accomplish the same goal but was mandated by a federal judge
and not implemented through voluntary measures.
462
See infra notes 494–506 and accompanying text.
463
See Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (Tex. 1904).
464
Id.
465
See, e.g., infra notes 497–503 and accompanying text.
466
See Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618,
633 (Tex. 1996).
467
Id.
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production.468 “Today, again, we reiterate that the people have constitutionally empowered the Legislature to act in the best interest of the State to
preserve our natural resources, including water.”469 Declaring regulation
as a “legislative function” creates a high level of deference to a district’s
decision.470
Later, the Day court echoed much of the same sentiments even
while simultaneously creating a vested property right.471 Stating that
“districts have broad authority,”472 the opinion provides a detailed review
of the obligations placed on districts by Chapter 36.473 When discussing
how a Penn Central takings test might be applied to groundwater regulation, the court unambiguously states, “[u]nquestionably, the State is
empowered to regulate groundwater production” and “[r]egulation is
essential to its conservation and use.”474 A district’s ability to successfully
manage groundwater begins with the understanding of which uses are
permissible and which are not.475
3.

Waste Not, Want Not

A threshold consideration for a groundwater permit is whether
the water will be put to a beneficial use.476 “Beneficial” is defined broadly
to include most uses,477 and while the statutes do not clearly or fully
define the parameters of what is included within the term, wasteful uses
do not qualify.478 Throughout the statutes and case law, prohibitions on
waste can be found.479 In Chapter 36, waste is defined as:
. . . one or more of the following:
468

See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 79 (Tex. 1999).
Id. (listing the history of legislation that both created and emboldened DCDs to manage
groundwater through planning and permitting).
470
See id. at 78–79 (referring to the rational basis test applied in Barshop).
471
See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 833 (Tex. 2012).
472
Id. at 834.
473
Id.
474
Id. at 840.
475
See discussion infra Section IV.A.3.
476
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.113(d)(3), (6).
477
Id. § 36.001(9).
478
“‘Use for a beneficial purpose’ means use for: (A) agricultural, gardening, domestic,
stock raising, municipal, mining, manufacturing, industrial, commercial, recreational,
or pleasure purposes; (B) exploring for, producing, handling, or treating oil, gas, sulphur,
or other minerals; or (C) any other purpose that is useful and beneficial to the user.” Id.
479
See, e.g., Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (Tex. 1904); Day, 369 S.W.3d
at 833–34; Pecos Co. Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 503
(Tex. App. 1954).
469
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withdrawal of groundwater from a groundwater
reservoir at a rate and in an amount that causes or
threatens to cause intrusion into the reservoir of
water unsuitable for agricultural, gardening, domestic, or stock raising purposes;
the flowing or producing of wells from a groundwater
reservoir if the water produced is not used for a
beneficial purpose;
escape of groundwater from a groundwater reservoir to any other reservoir or geologic strata that
does not contain groundwater;
pollution or harmful alteration of groundwater in
a groundwater reservoir by saltwater or by other
deleterious matter admitted from another stratum
or from the surface of the ground;
willfully or negligently causing, suffering, or allowing groundwater to escape into any river, creek,
natural watercourse, depression, lake, reservoir,
drain, sewer, street, highway, road, or road ditch .
..;
groundwater pumped for irrigation that escapes as
irrigation tailwater onto land other than that of
the owner of the well unless permission has been
granted by the occupant of the land receiving the
discharge; or
for water produced from an artesian well, “waste”
also has the meaning assigned by Section 11.205.480

Section 11.205 adds that:
Unless the water from an artesian well is used for a purpose and in a manner in which it may be lawfully used on
the owner’s land, it is waste and unlawful to wilfully cause
or knowingly permit the water to run off the owner’s land or
to percolate through the stratum above which the water is
found.481

480

WATER § 36.001(8) (West 2019). A definition for waste is not included in the TWDB
definitions, although it is used throughout the rules. It is reasonable to assume that the
Chapter 36 definition would apply to the TWDB regulations.
481
Id. § 11.205. An artesian well is a one in which the aquifer is under sufficient pressure
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In 1955, the Texas Supreme Court provided a waste analysis in
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton.482 In the case, a bed and banks
permit was requested to transport artesian groundwater over 118 miles
to its end user.483 At issue were the carriage losses through evaporation
and seepage, which were projected to total up to sixty-three–seventy-four
percent.484 The challengers claimed that the lost water constituted waste
and should not be permitted.485 Although the court agreed that waste is
not permitted by law,486 it ultimately determined this did not qualify.487
In examining whether the facts justified a finding that water had
been wasted, the court noted that no common-law limitation for the
means of transporting the water to the place of use could be found and
that the question of whether the use to which the water is put is lawful
or unlawful cannot reasonably turn on whether some of the water put
into the system escapes during transportation.488 The decision noted that
the water transported was intended for a beneficial use, despite the amount
lost in transport.489 The court concluded that the legislature could prohibit the use of any means of transportation of groundwater that allowed
the escape of excessive amounts but that it had not done so.490
Although this case is often cited as binding on a waste determina491
tion, new cases can easily be distinguished.492 First, this case was
decided sixty-six years ago and Texas is a very different place.493 At that
time, only 8.66 million people lived in Texas.494 Currently, that number

from an overlying confining rock later that the water flows naturally without requiring
a pump. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., Artesian Water and Artesian Wells, https://www.usgs
.gov/special-topic/water-science-school/science/artesian-water-and-artesian-wells?qt-sci
ence_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects [https://perma.cc/XR2W-27SN] (last
visited Jan. 12, 2022).
482
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tex. 1955).
483
Id. at 800.
484
Id.
485
Id. at 799.
486
Id. at 801.
487
Id. at 801–02.
488
City of Corpus Christi, 276 S.W.2d at 801–02.
489
Id. at 803–04.
490
Id. at 802–03.
491
See, e.g., City of San Marcos v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 128 S.W.3d 264, 271
(Tex. 2004).
492
Id.
493
See Corpus Christi, 276 S.W.2d at 798.
494
TEX. STATE LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMM’N, United States and Texas Populations 1850–2017
(Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ref/abouttx/census.html [https://perma.cc/CEE2
-NFEN].
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totals almost 29 million.495 The value of water has changed since there
has been increased demand with no additional supply,496 and the state
better understands the science of this resource.497 Further, the Corpus
Christi case involved rules related to artesian water and a bed and banks
transfer;498 therefore, new cases should interpret these obligations based
on current realities.
Waste re-emerged as an issue in a recent permit application
dispute with a similar fact pattern. In February 2018, the Lower Colorado
River Authority (“LCRA”) submitted eight permit applications to the Lost
Pines Groundwater Conservation District (“Lost Pines”) to withdraw
25,000 acre-feet of water per year from eight wells in the Simsboro Formation in Bastrop County, Texas.499 LCRA also requested approval to transport some of that water using the bed and banks of the river.500 Draft
permits were issued by the general manager (“GM”) and several parties
objected.501 “Environmental groups argued that the amount requested
was more than the aquifer could safely sustain.”502 Local landowners and
the city of Elgin, who also had wells in the Simsboro, were concerned
about water level impacts from the additional pumping and resulting
well depletion.503 The objections led to a week-long contested case hearing at SOAH.504
The primary issue with the draft permits included a number of
conditions.505 One of these prohibited the use of the bed and banks as a
conduit for transport.506 In his denial of the request, the GM cited concerns
495

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Quick Facts Texas, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table
/TX/PST045219# [https://perma.cc/B96Y-NKSN] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
496
TEX. WATER DEV. BD., WATER FOR TEXAS: REGIONAL WATER PLANNING IN TEXAS, 6 (2017),
http://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/shells/RegionalWaterPlanning.pdf [https://perma
.cc/GVQ2-SS76].
497
PETER G. GEORGE ET AL., TEX. WATER DEV. BD. Report 380, AQUIFERS OF TEXAS 4 (2011).
498
See Corpus Christi, 276 S.W.2d at 803.
499
Application of Lower Colo. River Auth. For Operating and Transp. Permits for Eight
Wells in Bastrop Cnty., Tex. Proposal for Decision at *1, SOAH No. 952-19-0705 (SOAH
Hearing Mar. 31, 2020).
500
STATE OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, Application of Lower Colo. River Auth. For Operating
and Transp. Permits for Eight Wells in Bastrop Cnty., Tex., No. 952-19-0705, at 1 (2020).
501
Id.
502
Id.
503
Brandon Mulder, Court Sides with LCRA in Bastrop County Water Fight, AUSTIN-AM.
STATESMAN (Apr. 7, 2020, 10:59 AM), https://www.statesman.com/news/20200407/court
-sides-with-lcra-in-bastrop-county-water-fight [https://perma.cc/PEY3-QKD4].
504
Id.
505
Id.
506
STATE OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, supra note 500, at 8.

2022] NEW STRATEGIES FOR GROUNDWATER LITIGATION IN TEXAS

407

about water loss through evaporation or carriage losses and stated that
LCRA had not presented any plan to minimize losses through transport.507 The GM argued that inclusion of this condition was within the
district’s authority and obligation to prevent waste pursuant to Chapter
36.508 In his opinion, discharge of any amount of groundwater into the
bed and banks would constitute waste as defined by Texas Water Code
Section 36.001(8)(e).509
LCRA argued that the limitation was outside the authority of the
district and that transport using a watercourse was not per se waste.510
To make the latter argument, LRCA focused on the word “escape.”511 In
LCRA’s view, when a permit to transport groundwater via bed and banks
of a watercourse is obtained prior to discharge, the groundwater does not
“escape” because ownership is maintained until a later diversion.512 Citing
case law including Corpus Christi v. Pleasanton, LCRA reasoned that a
bed and banks permit allowed water ownership to be retained after discharge, unlike in a situation where no permit was obtained.513 Carriage
losses were estimated to only be ten percent, which is less than losses
common in pipes, which they stated can be up to twenty percent.514
In their March 2020 opinion, the ALJs determined that the bed
and banks condition was not appropriate and should be removed.515 While
they agreed that GCDs have a duty to ensure that groundwater is put to
beneficial use and the authority to control waste of groundwater, they did
not agree that any discharge into a watercourse met the waste
threshold.516 They determined that such a conclusion was overbroad to
accomplish the District’s stated purpose of preventing groundwater
waste in transport.517 They agreed with LCRA that “escape” was not
applicable here because of the retained ownership.518 Finally, the ALJs

507

Id.
Id.
509
Id. at 61–62.
510
Id. at 63.
511
Id. (LCRA also argued that the permit amendment made this condition unnecessary
and, pointing to a permit that did allow for bed and banks, they preferred that the
district could be more restrictive on transporters than it is on in-district users).
512
STATE OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, supra note 500, at 63.
513
Id. at 64.
514
Id. at 65.
515
Id.
516
Id. at 65–66.
517
Id. at 66–67.
518
STATE OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, supra note 500, at 63.
508
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stated that even if the condition had been more narrowly tailored to
prevent waste, the condition should still be removed because Lost Pines
presented no evidence to prove waste would occur.519
Although this opinion may look like a reiteration of the Corpus
Christi holding, there are important distinctions.520 Rather than determining that waste is not contemplated in a bed and banks transfer, the
ALJs left the door open for such a requirement and provided important
information about what evidence would need to be provided to support
such a decision.521 It can be inferred that a groundwater district presenting substantial evidence for denying a permit based on a waste concern
would be fulfilling their statutory obligations.522 The challenge for districts is predicting what evidence would suffice.523
While waste has not been litigated in the groundwater permitting
context in Texas,524 predicting what may constitute waste can be inferred
from surface water allocation regimes and groundwater law from other
states.525 For example, Arizona does not include a definition of waste in
the groundwater code;526 however, it does state that waste or withdrawn
groundwater is prohibited specifically as it relates to water loss through
“leaky casing, lack of casings, pipes, fittings, valves or pumps, either above
or below the surface of the ground.”527 The danger of listing something
this specific is the implication that anything not listed is permissive.
For agricultural users, such a definition can provide challenges
depending on the irrigation methods used.528 Traditional watering practices
such as flood irrigation could easily trigger a waste evaluation using
Arizona’s definition.529 A process must be adopted that balances historic
use with the cost of updating systems. One option to assess the extent of
a beneficial allotment would be to look at water duty of a certain crop in
a region. Water duty is the quantity of water required to satisfy the

519

Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 64–65. SOAH did state that LCRA’s burden to show no waste was negated by
their amended permits that no longer sought to transport water out of the district.
521
Id.
522
See id. at 65–68.
523
Id. at 65–66.
524
STATE OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, supra note 500, at 64–65.
525
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-602 (West 2021).
526
Id. See also ARIZ. DEP’T OF ENV’T QUALITY, GLOSSARY OF TERMS 21 (2021).
527
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-602 (West 2021).
528
STATE OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, supra note 500, at 66.
529
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-602 (West 2021).
520
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irrigation water requirements in a given area.530 Embedded in this approach is an understanding that there is a limit to the amount of water
that can be used beneficially for a certain purpose.531 A challenge in calculating water duty is deciding how efficient the benchmark system
needs to be while recognizing that new technologies can be very costly.532
Rather than base beneficial use on drip or sprinkler irrigation, it should
be based on reasonably efficient practices such as lined ditches, efficient
application practices, and land leveling.533 Similar assessments can be
made for municipal users to help advance conservation in city environments.534
What is considered wasteful might change based on current rainfall or groundwater storage levels. There is a question of whether to limit
uses that would be wasteful even in times of plenty or implement cutback measures during shortfall.535 This decision rests on both the geology
of the aquifer and its ability to recharge, as well as if the policy goal is to
be reactive or proactive.536 The obvious challenge with groundwater is
that a late decision could lead to long term shortages if the aquifer has
slow or no recharge.537 Groundwater and aquifer resilience depends
heavily on avoided demand;538 therefore, a broader interpretation of waste
530

See Water Rights Law: Prior Appropriation, FINDLAW (Aug. 31, 2017), https://corporate
.findlaw.com/business-operations/water-rights-law-prior-appropriation.html [https://
perma.cc/7B5C-FA8Z].
531
Jeff Gittins, What Is Duty of Water?, UTAH WATER L. & WATER RTS. (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://utahwaterrights.blogspot.com/2010/09/what-is-duty-of-water.html [https://perma
.cc/5YGR-JT48].
532
See William J. Cosgrove, Water Management: Current and Future Challenges and
Research Directions, 51 WATER RES. RSCH. 4823, 4832 (2015).
533
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-564(A)(1) (West 2021); see also Haseeb Jamal, Methods
of Improving and Factors Affecting Duty of Water, ABOUTCIVIL (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www
.aboutcivil.org/duty-factors-affecting-improving-duty.html [https://perma.cc/36LC-L9QD].
534
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-564 (A)(1) (West 2021); Jamal, supra note 533.
535
See Timothy L. O’Brien, Can the Southwest Survive With Less Water?, BLOOMBERG
(July 18, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2021-opinion-us-drought-southwest
-arizona-water-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/4ZFG-SECW]; STATE OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, supra
note 500, at 66–67.
536
See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., Aquifers and Groundwater, https://www.usgs.gov/special
-topic/water-science-school/science/aquifers-and-groundwater?qt-science_center_ob
jects=0#qt-science_center_objects [https://perma.cc/PFE2-4ER2#qt-science_center_objects]
(last visited Jan. 12, 2022); O’Brien, supra note 535.
537
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., supra note 536.
538
Cf. INT’L ASS’N OF HYDROGEOLOGISTS, STRATEGIC OVERVIEW SERIES: CLIMATE-CHANGE
ADAPTATION & GROUNDWATER 3–5 (2019), https://iah.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07
/IAH_Climate-ChangeAdaptationGdwtr.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD9P-GJYM] (discussing
the importance of demand and supply management).
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is important.539 Avoided demand has the added financial benefit of delaying the need to locate and import additional supply.540
While the court in Corpus Christi held that water loss during
transport was an all-or-nothing proposition,541 many other jurisdictions
have found ways to apply waste limitations.542 Chapter 36 clearly and
repeatedly prohibits waste.543 As the dissent in Corpus Christi noted, the
majority opinion “entirely overlooks the very purpose for which the conservation amendment and the statutes were passed . . . .”544 The legislature
is not required to draft a detailed numeric-based definition to ensure that
its intent is respected.545 What qualifies as waste is subject to the interpretation of districts and courts if their decisions are challenged.546 GCDs
should have some leeway to promulgate rules about waste based on the
characteristics of the aquifer and local conditions. Like beneficial use,
our understanding of waste should change over time as values change.
Population growth and increasing groundwater demand require that
waste be reviewed and used as a tool to critically review use.547
Building on the Lost Pines decision,548 GCDs should have latitude
to apply the waste prohibition in their permitting decisions so long as
they can support their decision with substantial evidence. The repeated
calls to avoid waste in statute provide a critical legal tool for districts to
legally limit pumping.549 A district’s unwillingness to thoughtfully consider
539

See STATE OFF. ADMIN. HEARINGS, supra note 500, at 2, 45.
See O’Brien, supra note 535; see, e.g., Herrera Franco et al., Groundwater Resilience
Assessment in a Communal Coastal Aquifer System, 12 SUSTAINABILITY 1, 3, 6–7 (2020);
Timothy F. Brick, The True Price of Imported Water, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUTE (Aug.
6, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-true-price-importedwater -2010aug06-story.html [https://perma.cc/Y7G8-J5L2].
541
Moreover, if the escape of the water is an unlawful “use” within the
meaning of the statutes, then the percentage of the escape through
evaporation, seepage, etc. is wholly immaterial; the use to which the
water is put cannot be a “little bit” unlawful on one occasion and a
“whole lot” unlawful on another.
See City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Tex. 1955).
542
Id. at 806–08.
543
See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.001(8)–(9) (West 2019); see also STATE OFF. ADMIN.
HEARINGS, supra note 500, at 66–67.
544
Corpus Christi, 276 S.W.2d at 808.
545
Id. at 806–07.
546
See, e.g., id. at 800–01, 805–07.
547
See supra notes 527–30 and accompanying text (discussing changes in population and
demand influencing groundwater value).
548
See supra notes 261–65 and accompanying text.
549
See supra notes 535–40 and accompanying text (discussing changes in population and
demand influencing groundwater value).
540
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waste and beneficial use raises important questions about whether they
are meeting their statutory obligations and can create liability, particularly
from those landowners who do not want to see excessive permitting.
4.

GCDs’ Chapter 36 Liability

While many recent lawsuits against GCDs have claimed Fifth
Amendment and other constitutional violations based on perceived curtailment of a vested property right,550 districts are at increasing risk for
challenges from litigants claiming the district has not fulfilled its statutorily required obligations.551
A person, firm, corporation, or association of persons affected by and dissatisfied with any rule or order made by
a district, including an appeal of a decision on a permit
application, is entitled to file a suit against the district
or its directors to challenge the validity of the law, rule, or
order.552
For qualifying litigants concerned about widespread drainage causing
environmental degradation, surface water impacts, or aquifer mining, a
suit could be brought to challenge a district’s management plan itself or
assert that permitting is inconsistent with the plan or the DFCs.553
In addition to the ability to file a claim as described above, Chapter 36 also provides specific guidance for appealing an adopted DFC.554
550

See supra Sections III.A–B.
See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.251–.066(a) (West 2015) (exempting limited types
of lawsuits and providing immunity to board members in their individual capacity). “The
burden of proof is on the petitioner, and the challenged law, rule, order, or act shall be
deemed prima facie valid.” Id. § 36.253.
552
Id. § 36.251. If a GCD is sued and prevails, “the district may seek and the court shall
grant, . . . in the same action, recovery for attorney’s fees, costs for expert witnesses, and
other costs incurred by the district before the court.” Id. § 36.066(g) (emphasis added).
During the 2021 legislature session, Senator Perry introduced SB152, which would
change the “shall” to “may.” S.B. 152, 87th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (as introduced on
Mar. 3, 2021).
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See TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.1071(a), (f)-1085 (West 2011).
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Not later than the 120th day after the date on which a district adopts
a desired future condition under Section 36.108(d-4), an affected person
may file a petition with the district requiring that the district contract
with the office to conduct a hearing appealing the reasonableness of the
desired future condition.
Id. § 36.1083(b).
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One challenge of using the DFC to reliably protect groundwater as envisioned by the legislature is the statutory obligation to update it every
five years.555 While the intent for this requirement may have been to
build in flexibility and ensure integration of up-to-date science,556 it can
create a moving goal post. If there is a challenge to a GCD for not meeting
a DFC, it can be altered to more closely resemble current conditions.557
The ability to alter a long-term goal and potentially allow for more dewatering undermines the stated purpose and weakens the ability of those
concerned to effectively challenge a district for not meeting the DFC
requirements.558 It is also problematic that the TWDB approves DFCs
based on their administrative completeness and whether they can be
achieved.559 The efficacy of a DFC would be strengthened by a critical
review of how the district’s DFC actually meets the goals listed in the
statute rather than reviewing for completeness.560 While GCDs have
obligations to meet, courts can also be more protective of groundwater
and the Chapter 36 goals within traditional Fifth Amendment challenges.
B.

Taking Another Look at Takings

Despite a GCD’s efforts to meet their Chapter 36 responsibilities,
more Fifth Amendment claims are bound to arise.561 Because each takings
claim is evaluated independently as an ad hoc, factual inquiry,562 a volume
of jurisprudence is needed to fully understand the meeting point between
permissible regulation and property rights. Currently, Texans only have
the Bragg decision to assist in that assessment;563 however, inverse
condemnation jurisprudence, groundwater management requirements,
and recent court language demonstrate that GCDs should be given broad
latitude in a compensation challenge.564
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The Day decision instructs that Fifth Amendment challenges in
Texas should follow federal takings jurisprudence.565 Inverse condemnation cases fall into three basic categories: physical invasion, total economic deprivation, and partial economic deprivation.566 Physical invasion
is unlikely to be triggered by a groundwater permitting decision,567 so
cases will primarily fall within the two economic deprivation categories,
with the latter being more common.568 Total economic deprivation cases
follow the Lucas case and partial deprivations follow Penn Central.569
A total economic deprivation is challenging in this context because
there is almost always remaining value even if a permit is fully denied.570
One need look no further than Bragg to find an example where this is
true.571 All of the Braggs’ requested water right was denied for the
D’Hanis tract,572 but the land still had value;573 therefore, Lucas was not
applied.574 Additionally, landowners cannot legally be denied all access
to water because the law exempts domestic and livestock uses.575 This
exemption is not de minimis, allowing for 25,000 gallons a day to be
pumped for these purposes.576 While that water cannot be sold or used for
large-scale commercial application,577 it would still likely constitute
enough value to fail the Lucas test.578
A potential exception to a traditional litigant who retains property
rights in the surface estate even if denied a groundwater permit is
someone who only purchases a severed groundwater estate.579 If an
owner of a groundwater estate is denied a withdrawal permit, a successful
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takings claim is more likely under the Lucas test.580 This fact pattern
would be analogous to Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.581 In that case, a state
statute prohibited coal mining that would result in removal of support
causing subsidence and damaging homes.582 The Pennsylvania Coal Company sued, arguing that the value of their property right was negated if the
mineral could not be excavated.583 The court agreed stating, “[w]hat makes
the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. To
make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly
the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying
it.”584 As groundwater severance becomes more common, a similar takings
argument may arise, but only if all water access is denied.585 If even a
partial permit were granted, Lucas would not be available.586
An important caveat to a Lucas inquiry is that the government
can avoid paying compensation, even after deprivation of all economic
value, “if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title
to begin with.”587 In other words, something that is not part of the bundle
of sticks cannot be taken by a government regulation.588 When applied to
groundwater, this means that a GCD could avoid paying compensation for
denying access to water because the use is deemed too wasteful, or
otherwise not beneficial.589 Someone with a vested right in groundwater
has no more right to use it contrary to common law and the Chapter 36
restrictions than a landowner wishing to use their property in a way that
creates a nuisance.590 The majority of groundwater takings cases will follow a Penn Central analysis.591 The Supreme Court laid out three factors for
courts to consider whether compensation was required for a partial economic deprivation resulting from a regulation.592 These factors are: (1)
“[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”; (2) “the extent
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to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations”; and (3) “the character of the governmental action.”593 The
court instructed that none of these factors are more important than the
others.594 In essence, these factors provide a balancing test that weighs
the impact on the individual against the importance of the government
regulation causing the infringement.595 Courts have wide latitude in how
they wish to stack the deck on either side and consider surrounding
circumstances.
Penn Central, and the long line of subsequent land-use-related
jurisprudence, makes clear that the government is given wide latitude
to limit private rights when such action is supported by the police power
and the harm is balanced by the importance of the government action.596
“A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”597
Although the court in Bragg spent very little time contemplating
the importance of protecting water resources when applying the “nature
of the government action” prong,598 other courts like the one in GG Ranch
appear to lean a different way.599 In its ruling, the district court stated:
The State of Texas has a compelling and legitimate interest in managing and protecting the Edwards Aquifer, which
is the primary source of water for many Texas residents
and vital to the state’s economy and welfare. . . . Water
management and conservation are uniquely compelling
state interests, and failure to protect water supplies could
be catastrophic for the economic health of the State of
Texas and the welfare of its residents. Simply stated,
access to water is necessary to sustain life.600
593
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Even the Day court recognized both the importance of and the
legal authority for regulations.601 If a court truly focused on the importance of water for life, property values, and the Texas economy, as denoted
in Chapter 36 and the conservation amendment, and weighed that against
a property impact to one individual, many district rules would not necessitate compensation.602
This paradigm shift toward the importance of the regulation is not
inconsistent with courts in other jurisdictions making similar waterrelated determinations.603 States have successfully defended themselves
against takings claims for canceling riparian rights when transitioning to
a statutory system or when pumping was reduced to protect endangered
species.604 If the purpose of a taking is to balance the rights of the individual with the importance or necessity of the regulation, it would be difficult to find something more important than protecting water resources on
behalf of the larger community.605 “The weight of modern authority counsels
against a court finding a taking of groundwater ‘rights’ based upon
adoption of the public trust doctrine, even if adoption limits present and
future groundwater use.”606
Another prong of the Penn Central test worth review is investmentbacked expectations.607 While this is generally discussed in relation to the
owner who is claiming the infringement,608 in this context it raises a
question about the importance of the investment-backed expectations of
an owner who wishes groundwater be maintained in place.609 By allowing
the law to focus so specifically on the expectations of one owner, current
law is essentially ignoring the expectations of their neighbors.
Bragg presents a useful hypothetical.610 In that case, the court’s
opinion focused on the expectation the family held when they purchased
601
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property to cultivate a pecan farm with increasingly larger trees, which
require more water.611 When they purchased the property, they expected
to be able to access the water they needed without regulatory interference.612 If that pumping depleted a neighbor who purchased their property with the expectations of passing it down for generations, shouldn’t
those invested-backed expectations also be respected by the law?
While it is clear that in private areas there is no liability between
users,613 in a region regulated by a groundwater district it can be argued
that all landowners’ investment-backed expectations deserve representation and property rights protections through the permitting process.614
While that does not mean that water levels cannot change, it may mean
that a more wholistic approach of harm is considered.615 Admittedly, this
concept is inconsistent to traditional takings considerations because a
regulatory taking usually originates when a government action, such as
promulgation of rules, deprives an owner of a property interest.616 Here,
the deprivation caused by drainage might be due to a government inaction, such as a district’s failure to regulate, thus infringing on a valid
property interest.617 Although the Fifth Amendment approach might be
estopped on this basis,618 the Chapter 36 rules requiring conservation
and protection may accomplish the same task.619
C.

Surface Water Impact Protection

In addition to considering comparative groundwater rights among
surface estate owners, the current regulatory regime places surface water
rights holders at a distinct disadvantage when compared to groundwater
rights holders.620 In Texas, there is no liability for diminution of surface
water flow due to groundwater pumping.621 However, “[t]he results of
611
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groundwater pumping on surface flows can be catastrophic.”622 Lack of
consideration for surface water rights during the groundwater permitting
process can lead to devastating ecologic losses and render senior permits
unusable.623 In Texas, the inability of surface water permit holders to
access their water rights would have huge property and economic ramifications.624
Texas has changed a lot since 1954, and some may argue that the
time has come for the legislature to listen to the El Paso Court of Appeals
and change the law;625 however, until that time, surface water users have
Chapter 36 to assist them.626 The obligatory GCD management plan must
address “conjunctive surface water management issues.”627 In addition,
it instructs that it be written in coordination with surface water managers.628 This concept again appears in the joint management expectations,
which states that “districts shall consider . . . other environmental impacts, including impacts on spring flow and other interactions between
groundwater and surface water” when selecting their DFC.629
These obligations do not create the correlative rights sought in the
Comanche Springs case,630 but they do potentially provide a foothold for
injured surface water rights holders because an “affected party” is permitted to challenge a GCD rule or appeal the reasonableness of a DFC.631
It is an open question as to whether a surface water holder could survive
a standing challenge in this context, but it is hard to imagine that courts
would simply ignore damage to a senior water right caused by groundwater pumping and the state may finally pay some attention to a long
overdue legal oversight.
CONCLUSION
Texas groundwater law is challenging. Through decades of case law
and legislation, the state aims to vest property rights in groundwater
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while also requiring GCDs to manage aquifers through management
plans, desired future conditions, and permitting rules.632 Often these two
objectives are seen to be on a collision course. After the Texas Supreme
Court decision in Day, which vested groundwater rights in place, property right advocates hailed the decision as a victory.633 However, in the
almost ten years since that ruling, it is becoming clear that Day may have
assisted some property rights more than others. The threat of a takings
claim for a denied water right can create a perceived advantage for those
who wish to pump quantities in contravention of a district’s rules.634
Unfortunately, this leaves many other property interests unsupported,
including other groundwater owners who have economic expectations
tied to leaving water in the ground, surface water property rights holders, and the protection of related natural resources.635 A review of Texas
constitutional and legislative authority demonstrates that this apparent
conflict is more nuanced that it first appears.636
Day, while important, is not the only law that governs Texas
groundwater.637 Since at least 1917, the state has repeatedly expressed
the importance of protecting its natural resources going so far as to place
them within the public trust.638 Groundwater is included in these protections.639 The conservation amendment placed these resources in trust
of the state and authorized the creation GCDs to manage them on behalf
of the public.640 In addition to this delegation of power, Chapter 36 of the
Texas Water Code, as well as related TWDB regulations, enumerate
specific obligations to meet the amendment’s goals.641 Primary within
these are conservation, prevention of waste, and considering impacts to

632
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surface water and other natural resources.642 These obligations were not
overridden by Day. Instead, GCDs must function much like cities do in
a zoning context,643 and are imbued with the police powers to infringe on
property rights for the health, safety, and welfare of the community.644
As in the land use context, regulations can go “too far” requiring
compensation,645 but that line must be determined by the courts.646 Judges
are given latitude in how they weigh the infringement harm against the
importance of the government regulation.647 This legal opportunity can
shift some power back to those property owners who feel unrepresented
in the current reality and provide GCDs legal support to continue making
decisions that meet their Chapter 36 responsibilities. While many might
have seen Day as the final word on groundwater rights, it actually just
began a new legal conversation;648 one in which GCDs must continue to
apply Chapter 36 and courts must review the property rights of other
surface estate owners, surface water property rights holders, and the
resource itself to ensure the same protection and longevity first envisioned by the drafters of the conservation amendment over one hundred
years ago.649
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